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ABSTRACT 
  The American prison system is grappling with a well-publicized 
carceral crisis. In the words of former U.S. Attorney General Eric 
Holder, “too many Americans go to too many prisons for far too long, 
and for no truly good law enforcement reason.” And, as a result of 
developments in federal law over the past few decades, the power of 
federal prosecutors to decide when and how to charge individuals with 
crimes is crucial to when and how American citizens go to prison.  
  Many ideas have been proposed to revise prosecutorial 
discretionary powers, but few have been heeded by the Department of 
Justice (DOJ). However, this Note posits that the DOJ has already 
paved the way to enhanced guidance for federal prosecutors when 
charging individuals with crimes. This is because the DOJ’s 
prosecutorial guidance for charging corporations with federal crimes is 
more robust than the guidance for charging individuals. In particular, 
a discussion on collateral consequences is included in the corporate 
charging guidance, yet lacking in the individual charging guidance.  
  This enhanced corporate guidance has had the purposeful impact of 
curtailing the prosecution of corporate crime. This Note argues that a 
similar discussion of collateral consequences in the individual charging 
guidance could have important and far-reaching effects on the federal 
criminal regime. Perhaps more importantly, such a discussion could 
remedy some of the unfairness presented by the current system in which 
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federal prosecutors are guided to consider a superior set of factors 
before charging corporations with crimes.  
INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, federal prosecutors charged Carol Anne Bond with using 
a chemical weapon1 in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
Implementation Act of 1998.2 Bond, a Pennsylvanian microbiologist, 
had obtained an arsenic-based compound from work and a vial of 
potassium dichromate from Amazon online.3 She intended to use the 
chemicals to cause an “uncomfortable rash” on her former best friend, 
Myrlinda Haynes, after finding out that her own husband was the 
father of Haynes’s unborn child.4 Bond’s plan included spreading the 
chemicals in locations outside of Haynes’s home, including her 
mailbox.5 
Though these chemicals are potentially lethal at “high enough 
doses,” lethality was never a threat in this case.6 Furthermore, because 
the chemicals are extremely visible,7 Haynes simply “avoid[ed]” the 
chemicals when she saw them outside of her house.8 In the end, the 
only physical injury suffered throughout Bond’s twenty-four failed 
attempts to get back at her former best friend was a “minor chemical 
burn on [Haynes’s] thumb, which she treated by rinsing with water.”9 
For this, Bond received a six-year sentence in federal prison.10 
 
 1.  Joint Appendix at 13 (Indictment), Bond v. United States, 1315 S. Ct. 2355 (2011) (No. 
09-1227); see also id. at i (indicating the date of Bond’s indictment). 
 2.  18 U.S.C. § 229 (2012); see also Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2085 (2014) 
(“Federal prosecutors . . . charged Bond with two counts of mail theft . . . . [T]hey also charged 
her with two counts of possessing and using a chemical weapon, in violation of [18 U.S.C. §] 
229(a).”).  
 3.  Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2085. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  See id. (“Both chemicals are toxic to humans and, in high enough doses, potentially 
lethal. It is undisputed, however, that Bond did not intend to kill Haynes.”).  
 7.  See id. (stating that “[t]he chemicals that Bond used are easy to see”); see also PubChem 
Open Chemistry Database, Compound Summary for Potassium Dichromate, NAT’L CENTER FOR 
BIOTECH. INFO., http://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/compound/24502#section=Top [https://perma. 
cc/ARG6-U29C] (describing potassium dichromate as a compound that is “orange to red 
colored” and “bright”).  
 8.  Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2085. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at 2086. Bond’s sentence has been generally attributed to her chemical-weapons 
charge, although she was also charged with two counts of mail theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1708. It is impossible to know the breakdown of her sentence for certain, because the sentencing 
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The U.S. Supreme Court overturned Bond’s sentence in 2014, 
referring to the federal chemical-weapons charge against her as 
“unusual”11 and “surprising.”12 Noting a number of Pennsylvania laws 
that allow for local prosecution of her offensive conduct,13 the Court 
concluded that a federal prosecution of Bond was neither necessary14 
nor appropriate.15 Furthermore, and perhaps central to the holding,16 
the Court implied that this case demonstrated an inappropriate 
exercise of federal prosecutorial charging power: “[I]n its zeal to 
prosecute Bond, the Federal Government has ‘displaced’ the ‘public 
policy of . . . [Pennsylvania]’ that Bond does not belong in prison for a 
chemical weapons offense.”17 
The prosecutor, with all the power of her office, literally holds the 
lives of individuals in her hands.18 The job of the federal prosecutor is 
 
documents from her original appeal were sealed. See Defendant-Appellant’s Supplemental Reply 
Brief at 4 n.*, On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, Bond v. United States, 681 F.3d 149 (2012) (No. 07-528), rev’d, 1345 S. Ct. 2077 
(2014). 
 11.  The Court mentions that this case and the federal chemical-weapons charge are unusual 
two separate times in the opinion. See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2092 (“[W]ith the exception of this 
unusual case, the Federal Government itself has not looked to section 229 to reach purely local 
crimes.”); id. at 2093 (“This case is unusual, and our analysis is appropriately limited.”).  
 12.  See id. at 2085 (“Federal prosecutors naturally charged Bond with two counts of mail 
theft . . . . More surprising, they also charged her with two counts of possessing and using a 
chemical weapon . . . .”).  
 13.  See id. at 2092 (stating first that “Pennsylvania has several statutes that would likely 
cover [Bond’s] assault” and then referencing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2701 (2012) (simple assault), 
§ 2705 (reckless endangerment), and § 2709 (harassment)).  
 14.  See id. (“It is also clear that the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (and every 
other State) are sufficient to prosecute Bond.”).  
 15.  See id. at 2093 (“[T]here are no apparent interests of the United States Congress or the 
community of nations in seeing Bond end up in federal prison, rather than dealt with (like 
virtually all other criminals in Pennsylvania) by the State.”).  
 16.  See, e.g., Robert J. Anello & Richard F. Albert, Missing Fish, Obstruction Statute and 
Prosecutorial Discretion, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/ 
id=1202677879102/Missing-Fish-Obstruction-Statute-and-Prosecutorial-Discretion?slreturn= 
20151119114235 [https://perma.cc/PY85-HMTW] (“The Supreme Court’s . . . decision in . . . 
[Bond] suggest[s] that some members of the court are deeply troubled by the combination of the 
vast reach and severity of federal criminal law and the breadth of prosecutorial discretion.”). 
 17.  Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2093 (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2366 (2011)). 
In making this statement, the Court referenced Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion in Jones v. 
United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000). There, Justice Stevens described how the choice to federally 
prosecute a crime, when the federal sentence will be much higher than any sentence imposed at 
the local level, “illustrates how a criminal law . . . may effectively displace a policy choice made 
by the State” and upsets the federal–state balance. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 859 (2000) 
(Stevens, J., concurring).  
 18.  See infra Part II.  
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inarguably complex: she is “the representative not of an ordinary party 
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty . . . whose interest, therefore, in 
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice 
shall be done.”19 Yet, for all the momentous complexity of her 
decisions, she is guided primarily not by rules, but by suggestions.20 This 
is not to imply that a scheme of well-defined rules would make for a 
better system, but simply a statement of fact. 
Still, in the words of former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, 
“too many Americans go to too many prisons for far too long, and for 
no truly good law enforcement reason.”21 And, as a result of 
developments in federal law over the past few decades, the power of 
federal prosecutors to decide when and how to charge individuals with 
crimes is crucial to when and how American citizens go to prison.22 
Many ideas have been proposed to revise prosecutorial 
discretion,23 but few have been heeded by the Department of Justice 
(DOJ).24 However, it is possible that the DOJ itself has already paved 
the way to enhanced guidance for federal prosecutors when charging 
individuals with crimes. This is because the DOJ’s prosecutorial 
guidance for charging corporations with federal crimes is more robust 
than the guidance for charging individuals.25 In particular, a discussion 
on collateral consequences (the extrajudicial ramifications of 
prosecution) is included in the corporate charging guidance, yet lacking 
in the individual charging guidance.26 This enhanced corporate 
guidance has had the purposeful impact of curtailing the prosecution 
of corporate crime.27 The prosecution of individual crime deserves at 
least as much purposeful consideration, especially in light of the “too 
many Americans” in federal prison.28 
 
 19.  Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 20.  See infra Part III.  
 21.  Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar 
Association’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-
general-eric-holder-delivers-remarks-annual-meeting-american-bar-associations [https://perma. 
cc/BQ49-XEFB]. 
 22.  See infra Part I.  
 23.  See infra Part III.  
 24.  Generally, lobbying and proposals for reform have been most successful in the area of 
corporate crime. See infra Part III.A.  
 25.  See infra Part III.B.  
 26.  See infra Part IV.  
 27.  See infra Part IV. The increased equitable considerations in corporate charging guidance 
have also been the subject of much criticism. See infra Part V.  
 28.  Holder, supra note 21. 
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This Note posits that the evolution of corporate prosecutions 
during the last two decades demonstrates that the application of 
corporate charging guidance to the DOJ’s individual charging guidance 
could have important and far-reaching effects on the federal criminal 
regime. First, Parts I and II explain why federal charging discretion is 
crucial to Americans going to prison. Part I details how federal 
prosecutorial power increased with the emphasis on determinative 
sentencing starting in the 1980s. This Part then discusses the real stakes 
of charging discretion and the large-order effects of federal 
prosecutions. Part II reviews the general origins of, and current 
controls for, prosecutorial charging power. 
Then, moving to the charging power of federal prosecutors 
specifically, Part III discusses the different guidance used for charging 
individuals and corporations with crimes. Part IV discusses the 
difference that guidance makes. Lastly, Part V describes how and why 
we should level the playing field by applying corporate charging 
considerations to individuals. 
I.  THE RISE AND STAKES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL CHARGING 
POWER 
A. The Rise of Federal Charging Power 
Federal prosecutorial power increased substantially after the 
implementation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the late 1980s. 
Though the Sentencing Guidelines were designed to make federal 
sentencing more uniform by removing judicial discretion, they had the 
real effect of transferring discretionary power from federal judges to 
federal prosecutors.29 
The implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines began in 1984, 
when Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA).30 The SRA 
was a bipartisan initiative,31 a product of a mounting demand for 
greater uniformity and “truth” in federal sentencing during the 1970s 
and 1980s.32 The SRA instituted the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
 
 29.  See infra notes 37–47 and accompanying text.  
 30.  Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified at 18 U.S.C.  
§ 3551 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98). 
 31.  J.C. Oleson, Blowing out All the Candles: A Few Thoughts on the Twenty-Fifth Birthday 
of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 693, 696 (2011).  
 32.  See id. at 698 (explaining that the SRA was “conceived at a moment in U.S. history when 
the belief in indeterminate sentencing yielded to the belief in determinate sentencing”). Professor 
Oleson claims it is not “mere coincidence that Robert Martinson published his infamous ‘What 
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(USSC), which was responsible for promulgating the new Guidelines.33 
This new system was designed to eliminate the “unwarranted 
sentencing disparity”34 that arose when judges had wide-ranging 
discretion in determining a defendant’s prison sentence.35 With this 
broad judicial discretion, “[t]he length of time a person spent in prison 
appeared to depend on ‘what the judge ate for breakfast’ on the day of 
sentencing, on which judge you got, or on other factors that should not 
have made a difference to the length of the sentence.”36 
The SRA “fixed” these unwarranted sentencing disparities with 
the Sentencing Guidelines, which were effectively mandatory for all 
federal judges.37 The Guidelines consist of a sentencing grid, with 
 
Works?’ article (thereby sounding the death knell for the rehabilitative movement in the United 
States) just one year before Senator Kennedy launched the legislative initiative that would 
culminate in [the SRA’s] passage[,]” but rather that “penology and attendant sentencing practices 
were changing” and “both Martinson’s article and Kennedy’s initiative tapped into that shifting 
zeitgeist.” Id. (citations omitted); see id. at 700 (“By the early 1970s, some critics began to 
condemn the horror stories about identical offenders before different judges, one who received a 
sentence of probation while the other was sentenced to imprisonment.”). Professor Oleson also 
notes that this type of sentencing was condemned by Judge Marvin Frankel as “‘judicial 
lawlessness’ in 1972, and soon thereafter, the retributive calls for parity and predictability began 
to drown out the rehabilitative charge for transformation.” Id. at 700–01 (citing Marvin E. 
Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1972)). 
 33.  28 U.S.C. § 991 (2012). See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: 
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1690 (1992) (“[T]he SRA 
established as the centerpiece of reform a specialized administrative agency, the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, to become expert in sentencing research and to devise guidelines for federal 
judges.”). 
 34.  See Oleson, supra note 31, at 702 (“Indeed, it has been said that the primary goal of the 
Guidelines was the reduction of unwarranted sentencing disparity.”); see also supra note 32 and 
accompanying text (discussing widespread calls for greater sentencing uniformity in the years 
preceding the SRA). 
 35.  See, e.g., United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 564 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Before the 
implementation of a Guidelines-based sentencing system in 1984, ‘[s]tatutes specified the 
penalties for crimes but nearly always gave the sentencing judge wide discretion to decide whether 
the offender should be incarcerated and for how long . . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989))). These statutes also determined “whether 
[the recipient of the sentence] should be fined and how much, and whether some lesser restraint, 
such as probation, should be imposed instead of imprisonment or fine.” Id. (quoting Mistretta, 488 
U.S. at 363). 
 36.  Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 332 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 37.  Although federal judges technically retained the authority to sentence a defendant 
outside of the Guidelines range, this discretion was subject to stringent conditions, congressional 
monitoring, and strict appellate review. See, e.g., Freed, supra note 33, at 1697 (“Displacing much 
of the discretion available in the past, the [Sentencing Guidelines], together with the underlying 
statute, hold[] the judge accountable for every sentencing choice. He must state reasons for each 
sentence, including a ‘specific reason’ for some sentences, and his decision is subject to appellate 
scrutiny.” (citations omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (2012))); see also United States v. 
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sentence lengths graduated by the crime committed and the 
defendant’s characteristics.38 Inside the resulting matrix, sentences are 
prescribed within a narrow range.39 To sentence a defendant, all a 
federal judge needed to do was “select a sentence from within the 
[narrow] guideline range”40—thus, the judge’s power to make 
sentencing decisions was severely constrained.41 
For federal prosecutors, however, this highly structured 
sentencing scheme led to an increase in power.42 The charges brought 
and facts presented by the prosecutor were key, because they were, in 
effect, the equivalent of choosing the defendant’s sentence.43 Though 
the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the mandatory nature of the 
Sentencing Guidelines in 2005,44 the Guidelines remain an essential 
 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265 (2005) (“We do not doubt that Congress, when it wrote the [SRA], 
intended to create a form of mandatory Guidelines system.”).  
 38.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
 39.  See id. (“Where the guidelines call for imprisonment, the range must be narrow: the 
maximum of the range cannot exceed the minimum by more than the greater of 25 percent or six 
months.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2012) (“If a sentence specified by the guidelines 
includes a term of imprisonment, the maximum of the range established for such a term shall not 
exceed the minimum of that range by more than the greater of 25 percent or 6 months . . . .”). 
 40.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2. 
 41.  See Oleson, supra note 31, at 713 (“Judges who . . . tried to sentence below the 
Guidelines were stymied unless there existed a mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, 
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.”). Professor Oleson 
further notes that “[e]ven then, in deciding whether a factor had been adequately taken into 
consideration, judges were permitted to consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy 
statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission.” Id. (citation omitted). It is 
this “draconian nature” that “may explain why Justice Kennedy publicly condemned the 
harshness of the Guidelines and praised judges who found ways to exercise their departure 
authority.” Id.; see also id. at 725 (“[A]s soon as a judge departed downward from a Guidelines 
sentence . . . he would be reversed, even if the departure had been applied to redress sentencing 
disparity created by the unequal promulgation of [DOJ district-specific] programs.”). 
 42.  See, e.g., id. at 718 (“Having great leverage, prosecutors . . . controlled Guidelines 
sentencing far more than they had during the pre-Guidelines era.”). 
 43.  See Freed, supra note 33, at 1723 (explaining the concept of “relevant conduct” under 
the Sentencing Guidelines and noting that the “[d]iscretionary decisions of Assistant U.S. 
Attorneys, both as to charges and as to factual allegations, [could] powerfully expand or limit the 
judge’s ambit for sentencing”). 
 44.  The Supreme Court held that the Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional as 
written because they required the imposition of sentences based upon additional facts that 
sentencing judges found by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Booker, 543 
U.S. 220, 259 (2005) (“[W]e must sever and excise . . . the provision [of the Sentencing Guidelines] 
that requires sentencing courts to impose a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range (in 
the absence of circumstances that justify a departure) . . . .”). This imposition violated the Court’s 
Sixth Amendment holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey that “any fact that increases the penalty for 
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).  
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part of the federal sentencing process.45 Furthermore, they remain 
highly persuasive. Studies show that courts have largely continued to 
sentence defendants within the prescribed Guidelines ranges, despite 
their nonmandatory nature.46 This means that prosecutors continue to 
wield a certain determinative power with their decision to charge an 
individual with a particular violation of the law.47 
Moreover, the number of violations a federal prosecutor can 
choose from when charging someone with a crime is so enormous that 
it is essentially countless.48 The enormous number of federal laws 
 
 45.  See Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 351 (2009) (“[T]he sentencing court must first 
calculate the Guidelines range, and then consider what sentence is appropriate for the individual 
defendant in light of the statutory sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), explaining any variance 
from the former with reference to the latter.” (emphasis added)).  
 46.  See, e.g., Norman C. Bay, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Post-Booker World, 37 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 549, 570 (2006) (“[P]ost-Booker sentencing statistics show that, by and large, 
courts continue to sentence defendants within the relevant Guidelines range.”); Oleson, supra 
note 31, at 740 (using 2008 data from the USSC to explain that “[a]lthough data from the 
Commission suggests that national sentencing patterns have not changed dramatically after 
Booker, some circuits are showing greater fidelity to Guidelines sentencing than others” (citation 
omitted)).  
 47.  Although the determinative nature of the Guidelines (and, to some extent, the less 
determinative nature of the “advisory” Guidelines) placed great power into the hands of the 
prosecutor, this is not to say that the prosecutor’s decision to charge has not always been a source 
of great power. See infra Part II. Additionally, mandatory-minimum laws (laws which carry an 
obligatory minimum sentence upon conviction, adding to the prosecutor’s “determinative” 
powers) are also on the rise and contributing to federal prison population growth. A 2014 
Congressional Research Services (CRS) report noted that “the number of mandatory minimum 
penalties in the federal criminal code nearly doubled from 98 to 195 from 1991 to 2011.” NATHAN 
JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42937, THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION BUILDUP 8 
(2014). The CRS also reported that “the USSC found that, compared to FY1990 (43.6%), a larger 
proportion of defendants convicted of offenses that carried a mandatory minimum penalty in 
FY2010 (55.5%) were convicted of offenses that carried a mandatory minimum penalty of five 
years or more.” Id.  
 48.  See, e.g., Regulatory Crime: Solutions: Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task 
Force of 2013 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 21 (2013) (statement of Lucian E. 
Dervan, Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law) (stating that “currently 
over 4,450 criminal offenses [exist] in the United States Code and as many as 300,000 federal 
regulatory crimes”); Michael Cottone, Rethinking Presumed Knowledge of the Law in the 
Regulatory Age, 82 TENN. L. REV. 137, 141 (2014) (estimating the number of federal criminal laws 
at between 3,000 and 4,500); Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Many Failed Efforts to Count 
Nation’s Federal Criminal Laws, WALL ST. J. (July 23, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304319804576389601079728920 [https://perma.cc/7UPD-4C9J] (describing the 
American Bar Association’s 1998 failed attempt to count all of the federal criminal laws in 
existence and estimating the number of federal regulations alone at 10,000 to 300,000); see also 
Oleson, supra note 31, at 712 (stating that sentences operate on a “one-way ratchet,” tending to 
increase over time, “because ‘the story of American criminal law is a story of tacit cooperation 
between prosecutors and legislators, each of whom benefits from more and broader crimes, and 
growing marginalization of judges, who alone are likely to opt for narrower liability rules rather 
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(commonly referred to as “over-federalization”)49 makes it very likely 
that most Americans are in violation of some law.50 This means that the 
federal prosecution of anyone is a matter of choice—a choice that 
belongs to the prosecutor.51 The result, because “most Americans are 
criminals and don’t know it,” has been a de facto power of criminal 
determination exercised by federal prosecutors.52 
B. The Stakes of Federal Charging Power 
Lately, this de facto power has contributed to “too many 
Americans go[ing] to too many prisons for far too long.”53 The federal 
criminal system is overflowing with convicted individuals54: the federal 
prison population has grown 800 percent since 1980.55 This has 
 
than broader ones’” (quoting William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 505, 525–26 (2001))). 
 49.  See, e.g., Task Force Urged to Curb Over-Federalization of Criminal Law, U.S. COURTS 
(July 11, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2014/07/11/task-force-urged-curb-over-
federalization-criminal-law [https://perma.cc/XV53-UMPF] (“[T]he over-federalization of 
criminal law . . . is a cause of overcrowding in federal prisons.”). 
 50.  See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Misha Tseytlin, You’re (Probably) a Federal Criminal, in IN 
THE NAME OF JUSTICE: LEADING EXPERTS REEXAMINE THE CLASSIC ARTICLE “THE AIMS OF 
THE CRIMINAL LAW” 43, 50 (Timothy Lynch ed., 2009) (“Under [a system in which most people 
have committed some crime carrying serious consequences,] the authorities necessarily have vast 
discretion to choose who will remain free, well-respected members of society and who will be 
tossed in jail and lose their rights, their family, and their job.”); George Will, The Plague of 
Overcriminalization, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/394392/ 
plague-overcriminalization-george-will [https://perma.cc/67BP-B4MX?type=image] (stating that 
“Harvey Silverglate, a civil-liberties attorney, titled his 2009 book Three Felonies a Day to indicate 
how easily we can fall afoul of America’s metastasizing body of criminal laws” and that “Professor 
Douglas Husak of Rutgers University says that approximately 70 percent of American adults 
have, usually unwittingly, committed a crime for which they could be imprisoned”).  
 51.  See infra Part II. 
 52.  Kozinski & Tseytlin, supra note 50, at 44. 
 53.  Holder, supra note 21.  
 54.  See infra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.  
 55.  Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/population_ 
statistics.jsp [https://perma.cc/XC83-5KGC] (showing that the number of federal prisoners has 
grown from 24,640 in 1980 to 214,149 in 2014). 2014 actually marked the first decrease in federal 
prison population in over thirty-five years, as the 2013 population was 219,298. Id. This decrease 
is likely the result of a 5 percent decrease in admissions for federal prisons in 2014. Key Statistic: 
Prisoners, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, 
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty+pbdetail&iid=5387 [https://perma.cc/3WU3-6XQ4]. Although 
the number of American citizens prosecuted federally has, in fact, been on the decrease since 
2012, this has been largely attributed to policies driven by the Obama administration, including 
former U.S. Attorney General Holder. Whether or not these policies will endure with the next 
administration remains an open question. See infra notes 184–88 and accompanying text.  
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translated to an overcrowded56 and underfunded57 federal prison 
system. Enhancing the guidance federal prosecutors use when charging 
individuals with crimes could help to reduce the number of Americans 
in prison and alleviate some of these crowding and funding issues. 
More importantly, enhanced guidance could lessen sentencing 
disparities by integrating social-policy concerns that are ignored by the 
DOJ’s current individual charging guidance. 
These social-policy concerns have arisen from the collateral 
effects of incarcerating a large number of Americans in both federal 
and state penitentiaries.58 The effects are tied to the collateral 
consequences of conviction, accumulated on a mass level.59 Collateral 
consequences of conviction are those imposed by authoritative bodies 
other than the court.60 For example, “sex offender registration, civil 
 
 56.  The 2014 report for the Congressional Research Service shows that, on the macro level, 
the federal prison system was 36 percent over its rated capacity in fiscal year 2013. JAMES, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., supra note 47, at 2. However, high-security male prisons operated at 52 percent 
overcapacity and medium-security male facilities operated at 45 percent overcapacity. Id. at 21. 
The report explains:  
Data show that overcrowding in BOP facilities started to increase after FY1997, and it 
peaked in FY2004 when overcrowding was at 41%. . . . Overcrowding remained around 
35% between FY2005 and FY2010 after a steady growth between FY1997 and FY2004. 
However, prison overcrowding increased to 39% by the end of FY2011, the highest 
level since FY2004. Prison overcrowding decreased slightly in FY2012 (38%) and 
FY2013 (36%), due to a decrease in the institutional prison population (between 
FY2011 and FY2013 there were 1,085 fewer inmates held in BOP facilities), an increase 
in the number of beds (the BOP added 1,931 beds between FY2011 and FY2013), and 
greater use of contract bedspace (there were 2,615 more inmates in contract facilities 
in FY2013 than there were in FY2011). 
Id. at 19.  
 57.  The 2014 report also explains:  
[T]he BOP’s appropriations increased more than $6.544 billion from FY1980 ($330 
million) to FY2014 ($6.874 billion). Between FY1980 and FY2014, the average annual 
increase in the BOP’s appropriation was approximately $192 million. The data show 
that, by and large, growth in the BOP’s appropriation is the result of ever-growing 
appropriations for the [Salaries and Expenses] account. This is not surprising 
considering the constant growth in the federal prison population and the fact that the 
S&E account provides funding for the care of federal inmates.  
Id. at 10. 
 58.  See, e.g., Taja-Nia Y. Henderson, Teaching the Carceral Crisis: An Ethical and 
Pedagogical Imperative, 13 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS 104, 105–07 (2013). 
 59.  See generally Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Black Family in the Age of Mass Incarceration, THE 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/10/the-black-family-
in-the-age-of-mass-incarceration/403246 [https://perma.cc/4J7Q-WXUX] (discussing the massive 
level of Americans in prison, the collateral consequences of imprisonment, and the resulting effect 
on the population, particularly on African American families).  
 60.  Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 775, 784–86 (2016) 
(explaining the difference between direct and collateral consequences of conviction and noting 
that “collateral consequences ‘are not part of the explicit punishment handed down by the court; 
they stem from the fact of conviction rather than from the sentence of the court’” (quoting Padilla 
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commitment, . . . disqualification from public benefits (such as public 
housing or food assistance), ineligibility for business and professional 
licenses, termination or limitation of parental rights, and—for 
noncitizen defendants—deportation” are just some of the 
consequences of conviction imposed not judicially, but by other 
authoritative bodies.61 
The simplest solution for reining in the federal criminal regime 
may be to decrease the number of federal criminal laws on the books. 
However, “political support remains small for . . . repealing federal 
laws.”62 This reluctance has historical origins, first emerging with force 
during the civil rights era when conservatives employed “phrases like 
‘crime in the streets’ and ‘law and order’ [to equate] political dissent 
with crime.”63 A resulting “tough on crime” mentality grabbed ahold 
of many Americans64 and subsists today.65 In the face of this lingering 
“tough on crime” American mentality and the ever-growing amount of 
federal legislation, it is unlikely that the solution to the “too many 
Americans” in federal prison will be achieved by repealing criminal 
laws. Therefore, an alternative solution (and this Note) focuses on 
enhancing prosecutorial charging discretion. 
 
v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010))); Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the 
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly 
Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 634 (2006). 
 61.  Crane, supra note 60, at 785. 
 62.  Kozinski & Tseytlin, supra note 50, at 55. 
 63.  KATHERINE BECKETT & THEODORE SASSON, THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE: CRIME 
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 48 (2004); see also Coates, supra note 59 (stating that, after the 
1960s, “[t]he incarceration rate rose independent of crime—but not of criminal-justice policy,” 
and discussing how imprisonment rates in recent decades do not follow the rise and fall of crime 
rates).  
 64.  BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 63, at 49 (stating that it “appear[s] that the tough 
anticrime rhetoric struck a chord among some voters; those opposed to social and racial reform 
were especially receptive to calls for law and order”).  
 65.  See Jill Mizell, Overview of Public Opinion, in THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, AN 
OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC OPINION AND DISCOURSE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE ISSUES 7, 20 (Aug. 
2014), https://opportunityagenda.org/files/field_file/2014.08.23-CriminalJusticeReport-FINAL_ 
0.pdf [https://perma.cc/L383-H6UV] (“A new study by The Opportunity Agenda found that just 
more than half of Americans (54 percent) believe society is better served by harsher punishment 
for people convicted of crimes, and 46 percent believe society is better served by a greater effort 
to rehabilitate people convicted of crimes.”). However, declining levels in the majority support 
for harsher punishments may indicate a coming shift in public opinion. See, e.g., id. at 24 
(“Enforcement and punishment-oriented approaches to crime have been perceived as politically 
appealing over the past 30 years, but in recent years these policies have not matched up with 
public ideas of an effective criminal justice system.”). This shift is also evidenced not by a decrease 
in the number of federal criminal laws, but by an effort in Congress to reduce the severity of some 
federal sentences. See infra Part IV.B.  
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II.  PROSECUTORIAL CHARGING DISCRETION GENERALLY 
In the American criminal-justice system, several types of officials 
have the power to make far-reaching discretionary decisions.66 But it is 
the prosecutor’s office alone that decides whether charges will be 
brought against a potential defendant, and what those charges will be.67 
The discretionary power of the American prosecutor owes itself 
to European origins.68 The power to decline to prosecute harkens from 
the British principle of nolle prosequi, which resided solely with the 
English attorney general.69 The American criminal-justice system fully 
embraced this principle, extending it to not only attorneys general, but 
all prosecutors.70 Accordingly, courts upheld the ability of prosecutors 
to decline to prosecute in early cases such as The Confiscation Cases,71 
and definitively declared as early as 1925 that a court may not force a 
prosecutor to bring charges.72 
 
 66.  See generally Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Power, Discretion, and 
Misconduct, 23 CRIM. JUST. 24, 26–27 (2009) (excerpt from ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY 
JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR (2007)) (discussing the discretion 
afforded by the criminal-justice system to judges, prosecutors, and the police).  
 67.  Peter Krug, American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: U.S. National Reports 
to the XVIth International Congress of Comparative Law: Section V Prosecutorial Discretion and 
Its Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 643, 645 (2002). Prosecutors have the discretionary power to make 
other decisions as well—they decide which documents will be provided to the defense counsel 
during discovery, what information will be released to the press, whether the defendant’s property 
will be seized in accordance with forfeiture statutes, and whether to petition the court to reduce 
a defendant’s sentence for “substantial assistance.” See Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the 
Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 557–68 
(1999) (discussing the different areas throughout the criminal trial process in which prosecutors 
exercise discretion). 
 68.  Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
717, 728 (1996) (“Like the English Attorney General, the American prosecutor has the power to 
terminate all criminal prosecutions. Like the French procureur publique, the [American] 
prosecutor has the power to initiate all public prosecutions. Similar to the Dutch schout, the 
[American] prosecutor is a local official of a regional government.” (citations omitted)).  
 69.  Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty, 
and the Limits of Law, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 401 (2008). Nolle prosequi translates to 
“unwilling to pursue.” Id. This principle gave the attorney general “the power to end a 
prosecution without court inquiry.” Id.  
 70.  Id. 
 71.  The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457 (1868).  
 72.  See Milliken v. Stone, 7 F.2d 397, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1925), aff’d, 16 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1927) 
(“Furthermore, the federal courts are without power to compel the prosecuting officers to enforce 
the penal laws, whatever the grounds of their failure may be. The remedy for inactivity of that 
kind is with the executive and ultimately with the people.”). 
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Of the decisions entrusted to the prosecutor, the decision to 
charge an individual is arguably the most powerful.73 It is also virtually 
unreviewable.74 Consequently, limited legal avenues exist to provide a 
remedy to the defendant who may have been incorrectly charged.75 The 
Supreme Court has held that prosecutors have absolute immunity from 
civil suits arising from wrongful decisions to charge,76 and established a 
purposely “demanding” standard for defendants who claim to have 
been targeted for prosecution for impermissible discriminatory 
reasons.77 As the Supreme Court has stated, “courts are ‘properly 
hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute.’”78 As a result, 
“in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that 
[prosecutors] have properly discharged their official duties.”79 
The merits of entrusting prosecutors with such broad, 
unreviewable power have been debated at length.80 Those who argue 
against the prosecutor’s unfettered discretion to charge maintain that 
this power is more dangerous than beneficial, producing disparate 
 
 73.  See, e.g., Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, BYU L. 
REV. 669, 671 (1992) (“The decision to charge an individual with a crime is the most important 
function exercised by a prosecutor.”); Shelby A. Dickerson Moore, Questioning the Autonomy of 
Prosecutorial Charging Decisions: Recognizing the Need to Exercise Discretion—Knowing There 
Will Be Consequences for Crossing the Line, 60 LA. L. REV. 371, 403 (2000) (“The prosecutor’s 
office has become the most powerful office in the criminal justice system. Nowhere is this power 
more evident than in the areas of charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing.”). 
 74.  Krug, supra note 67, at 648 (2002) (“Although judicial mechanisms exist in the U.S. legal 
systems for individuals to compel a prosecutor to bring charges, it is generally accepted that they 
are used infrequently and are rarely successful.”); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: 
Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 
851, 862 (1995) (“The prosecutor’s decision to charge an accused is largely subject to the 
prosecutor’s discretion. The prosecutor’s charging discretion is, for the most part, unreviewable. 
So long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense, 
the prosecutor is entitled to bring the charge.”).  
 75.  Krug, supra note 67, at 645–50.  
 76.  Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976); see Krug, supra note 67, at 648 (discussing 
the limited avenues available to challenge prosecutorial discretion). 
 77.  United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996).  
 78.  Id. at 465 (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).  
 79.  Id. at 464 (quoting United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926)). 
 80.  See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision 
Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1662–63 (2010) (“There is a dated notion—both 
untenable and unattractive—that executive actors in the criminal justice system should be 
stripped of all discretion. Even in its day, it was a controversial proposition. Today, the argument 
is almost wholly rejected.”); Meares, supra note 74, at 863 (“The reasons underlying the 
prosecutor’s vast discretion have been well documented by commentators . . . .”); Sarat & Clarke, 
supra note 69, at 389 (“This emphasis on, and debate over, discretion is not new.”). 
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results81 from incontrovertible personal incentives and biases.82 
Advocates of preserving the broad powers of the prosecutor stress both 
practical and equitable needs for flexibility.83 These arguments 
underscore the necessity of balancing overcriminalization84 and the 
insufficient resources of prosecutors’ offices.85 These advocates 
contend that the procedural mechanisms available to deal with 
prosecutorial misconduct are sufficient, or could be, if properly 
employed.86 
 
 81.  Misner, supra note 68, at 761 (“Sometimes barely concealed in the debate on discretion 
and its fine points are what may be the real issues: why does the United States have a criminal 
justice system which incarcerates minorities at a disproportionately high rate?”). 
 82.  See generally Carrie Leonetti, When the Emperor Has No Clothes III: Personnel Policies 
and Conflicts of Interest in Prosecutors’ Offices, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 53 (2012) 
(discussing how police personnel policies fuel criminal overcharging); Douglas Noll, Controlling 
a Prosecutor’s Screening Discretion Through Fuller Enforcement, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 697, 698–
99 (1978) (arguing that current checks on prosecutorial discretion are inadequate and heightened 
checks are therefore warranted); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1554–60 (1981) (advocating for increased Due Process scrutiny of 
prosecutorial discretion to check prosecutorial power).  
 83.  See generally Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & 
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 369 (2010) (arguing that prosecutorial discretion is a desirable tool that can be 
used to overcome inequities associated with the indeterminacy of language in legal rules). The 
U.S. Supreme Court has also indicated that flexibility is needed to foster equitable charging 
decisions. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 794 (1977) (“The decision to file criminal 
charges, with the awesome consequences it entails, requires consideration of a wide range of 
factors in addition to the strength of the Government’s case, in order to determine whether 
prosecution would be in the public interest.”). 
 84.  See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 80, at 1665 (“Put succinctly, substantive overcriminalization 
increases not only the need for equitable discretion, but also the risk of its misuse or abuse.”). 
 85.  See, e.g., Misner, supra note 68, at 760 (“Some supporters of the broad role of 
prosecutorial discretion do so from the practical point of view that a system of lessened 
prosecutorial discretion would result in a need for heightened resources for the inevitable increase 
in criminal trials.”). 
 86.  See, e.g., Charles E. MacLean & Stephen Wilks, Keeping Arrows in the Quiver: Mapping 
the Contours of Prosecutorial Discretion, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 59, 62 (2012) (“Our preliminary 
assessment suggests that current, albeit imperfect, accountability mechanisms can be used to 
sanction errant prosecutors.”). MacClean and Wilks have explained that mechanisms for holding 
prosecutors accountable do exist: 
Although our data gathering continues, it is already clear that prosecutors are regularly 
held personally accountable for misconduct in office, most notably through sanctions 
against the prosecutors’ licenses to practice law; this is despite the high threshold for 
securing civil remedies against prosecutors under § 1983. . . . Scholars’ preoccupation 
with controversial or exceptional cases of prosecutorial misconduct is not only 
insufficient, but it does a disservice to lawyers, defendants, marginalized communities, 
the general public, and other affected stakeholders whose interests remain part of this 
conversation. While academics may dispute their efficacy, mechanisms for sanctioning 
prosecutorial misconduct do exist. 
Id. at 81. 
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Nonetheless, advocates and opponents alike have offered 
suggestions as to how prosecutorial charging discretion (and 
prosecutorial discretion in general) should be modified to ensure 
justice is being served. Suggestions for discretion reform come in two 
main varieties: ex ante and ex post. Ex ante reformers focus on what 
could, and arguably should, be done before a prosecutor ever arrives 
at a discretionary decision point. Ex post reformers focus on ways to 
guide or limit the discretionary power of prosecutors once a decision 
point has arisen. 
In the ex ante category, popular suggestions have included 
reforming education,87 heightening hiring criteria,88 and changing the 
culture of prosecutors’ offices.89 The scholars behind these suggestions 
generally reason that effective control of discretion must come from 
within.90 These ex ante reforms are largely designed to work with the 
systems already in place by proposing changes to the practical, human 
element of prosecution: the prosecutor herself.91 This can be 
juxtaposed with the goals of ex post reforms, which focus on applying 
external controls to prosecutors. 
Popular suggestions for ex post reforms have included legislative 
solutions,92 judicial remedies,93 and official office policies94 or 
 
 87.  Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 56, 57 (1971); Ellen S. 
Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1511, 1514–15 (2000). 
 88.  R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a 
Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to “Seek Justice,” 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 693–94 (2006); Laurie 
L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 
26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 568 (1999). 
 89.  Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 455–58 (1992); 
Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 643–44 
(1999). But see Janet C. Hoeffel, Prosecutorial Discretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets 
Brady, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1133, 1153–54 (2005) (arguing that though the solution to 
prosecutorial-discretion issues may be a cultural fix, no solution exists within the American 
adversarial model which would cure the prosecutorial culture of its unjust, competitive nature).  
 90.  See Levenson, supra note 88, at 568 (noting that prosecutorial-discretion “decisions are 
generally intuitive”); Podgor, supra note 87, at 1515 (“The key to changing the culture of an office 
is to have federal prosecutors consider ethics and professionalism in making all decisions.”).  
 91.  See Podgor, supra note 87, at 1514 n.20 (explaining that “this Article is limited to 
proposing a solution within the existing structure”).  
 92.  David Boerner, Sentencing Guidelines and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 JUDICATURE 
196, 200 (1995); Meares, supra note 74, at 901–02; Misner, supra note 68, at 720–22. 
 93.  Leonetti, supra note 82, at 82–87; Doug Lieb, Note, Vindicating Vindictiveness: 
Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining, Past and Future, 123 YALE L.J. 1014, 1020–21 
(2014). 
 94.  Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 262–63 (2001); 
Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 129 (2008).  
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memoranda.95 Of these, official office memoranda are most often 
suggested specifically for federal prosecution (as opposed to state or 
local prosecution).96 This is likely because federal prosecutorial 
discretion is guided primarily by the United States Attorneys’ Manual 
(USAM),97 which is often updated through official memoranda issued 
by the DOJ.98 
The USAM provides prosecutorial guidance for both individual 
and corporate crimes; however, as will be discussed in the next Part, 
the discussions allocated to each are not equal. The following Parts will 
explain the differences between the prosecutorial charging guidance 
for individual crimes and the guidance for corporate crimes, and then 
discuss why these differences should be resolved. 
III.  CHARGING DISCRETION AND GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL 
PROSECUTORS 
In the federal context, some aspects of charging discretion apply 
regardless of whether the defendant is an individual or a corporation. 
First, the decision to charge a crime is a product of prosecutorial 
discretion alone, although cases may be referred to a prosecutor from 
a variety of sources.99 This can be contrasted with charging decisions 
made by prosecutors at local levels, which arrive to prosecutors only 
because another official, usually law enforcement, has already 
 
 95.  Michael A. Caves, The Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Obligatory Charging Under the Ashcroft 
Memo, 9 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 1, 19–20 (2008); Mark Osler, This Changes Everything: A Call 
for a Directive, Goal-Oriented Principle to Guide the Exercise of Discretion by Federal 
Prosecutors, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 625, 627 (2005); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as 
Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1013 (2005); Fred C. 
Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 
VAND. L. REV. 45, 49–50 (1991); Brandon K. Crase, Note, When Doing Justice Isn’t Enough: 
Reinventing the Guidelines for Prosecutorial Discretion, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475, 483–86 
(2007). 
 96.  See, e.g., Caves, supra note 95, at 19–20 (proposing that changes to prosecutorial 
discretion be made through the issuance of an office memorandum); Osler, supra note 95, at 627 
(proposing the same). 
 97.  See infra Part III.A.  
 98.  See infra note 101. 
 99.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 04-422, U.S. ATTORNEYS: 
PERFORMANCE-BASED INITIATIVES ARE EVOLVING 15 (2004) (“U.S. Attorneys receive most of 
their criminal referrals, or ‘matters,’ from federal investigative agencies or become aware of 
criminal activities in the course of investigating or prosecuting other cases . . . . [T]he U.S. 
Attorney’s Office decides the appropriateness of bringing criminal charges and, if deemed 
appropriate, initiates prosecutions.”).  
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exercised charging discretion.100 This distinction serves to distinguish 
the power of federal prosecutors in making charging decisions, beyond 
even the broad discretionary power of other prosecutors. 
Second, after making the decision to hold a corporation or 
individual responsible for a crime, federal prosecutors often choose a 
defendant’s charges based upon not only culpable conduct, but the 
punishment that the charges carry as well.101 The defendant seldom 
chooses to go to trial after being charged, and instead elects the less-
risky option of entering into a plea agreement.102 
Of course, in plea agreements, the prosecutor has the majority of 
the power in determining the terms of the bargain.103 The defendant’s 
choices are usually limited to accepting the agreement or not.104 
Furthermore, if a binding plea agreement is settled upon, the 
prosecutor arguably wields even more power—after the defendant 
accepts the bargain, the only step left is the judge’s verification (or 
rejection) of the agreement.105 Everything, including the sentence, has 
already been determined by the prosecutor.106 However, much of the 
similarity between the federal prosecutions of corporations and 
individuals ends here. As described in the remainder of this Part, the 
corporate charging guidance is more detailed, more updated, and more 
 
 100.  See Melilli, supra note 73, at 676 (discussing the independent analysis a local prosecutor 
must apply when reviewing police charging decisions).  
 101.  See, e.g., Jonathan Drew, Military Selects Rarely Used Charge for Bergdahl Case, 
YAHOO! NEWS (Sept. 7, 2015), https://www.yahoo.com/news/military-selects-rarely-used-charge-
bergdahl-case-144326544.html [http://perma.cc/AEY3-UYPU] (“For Bergdahl, the Article 99 
offense allows the prosecutors to seek a stiffer penalty than the desertion charge, which in this 
case carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. 
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL (2015) § 9-27.300(A) (Selecting Charges—Charging Most Serious 
Offenses) [hereinafter USAM] (“[I]n determining [charges], it is appropriate that the attorney 
for the government consider, inter alia, such factors as the Sentencing Guideline range yielded by 
the charge . . . .”).  
 102.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2013 DATAFILE, TABLE 11: GUILTY PLEAS AND 
TRIALS IN EACH PRIMARY OFFENSE CATEGORY, FISCAL YEAR 2013, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2013/Table11.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/887E-YA7P] (explaining that 96 percent of federal criminal defendants enter 
into a plea bargain instead of going to trial according to data as of 2013). 
 103.  Bay, supra note 46, at 554 (“If the parties enter into plea negotiations, the prosecutor 
wields the discretion to control the terms of an offer.”). 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3); see Wes R. Porter, The Pendulum in Federal Sentencing Can 
Also Swing Toward Predictability: A Renewed Role for Binding Plea Agreements Post-Booker, 37 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 469, 493 (2011) (discussing how the use of binding plea agreements was 
limited under the Sentencing Guidelines, but may be expanded post-Booker, as the Guidelines 
are only advisory). 
 106.  See supra note 105. 
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considerate of the larger effects of prosecution than the individual 
charging guidance. 
A. Charging Individuals with Federal Crimes 
When charging individuals with crimes, mandatory rules shaping 
federal prosecutors’ decisions are limited.107 Unquestionably, 
prosecutors may not selectively prosecute individuals on the basis of 
race, religion, or any other “arbitrary classification” or protected 
right.108 Beyond the impermissibility of such selective prosecution, 
however, the charging discretion of federal prosecutors is largely 
subject to nonmandatory guidelines.109 
 
 107.  See Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper 
Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 999 (1995) (“The United States 
Attorneys’ Manual . . . does contain some general standards for the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion, but they are written so broadly that they provide little guidance.”); see also 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“In our system, so long as the prosecutor has 
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision 
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests 
entirely in his discretion.”). 
 108.  Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (quoting Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 
364). Although, as noted in Part II, prevailing on a claim of selective prosecution is difficult, and 
some scholars espouse the opinion that it has yet to be accomplished on the grounds of race. See 
Gabriel J. Chin, Unexplainable on Grounds of Race: Doubts About Yick Wo, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1359, 1361 (2008) (“[T]here are ‘no reported federal or state cases since 1886 that had dismissed 
a criminal prosecution on the ground that the prosecutor acted for racial reasons.’” (quoting 
DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 159 (1999))); see also Melissa L. Jampol, Note, Goodbye to the 
Defense of Selective Prosecution, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 932, 932 (1997) (arguing that 
“the Supreme Court’s decision in [Armstrong] impose[d] a barrier that is too high for almost any 
defendant alleging selective prosecution to obtain discovery, thus making the already difficult 
claim of race-based selective prosecution virtually impossible to prove”). 
 109.  See USAM, supra note 101, § 9-27.001 (stating that the USAM’s “principles of [f]ederal 
prosecution . . . . have been cast in general terms with a view to providing guidance rather than to 
mandating results” with the intent to “assure regularity with regimentation”); id. § 9-27.140 
(stating that “United States Attorneys . . . may modify or depart from the principles [of federal 
prosecution within the USAM] as necessary in the interests of fair and effective law 
enforcement”); Osler, supra note 95, at 626. Osler notes: 
What guides federal prosecutors in exercising this discretion? One would think there 
would be an easy answer, a directive, goal-oriented principle that would consistently 
guide those important choices. There is not. Rather, discretion is exercised in an 
inconsistent manner by local U.S. Attorneys and Assistant U.S. Attorneys, who each 
employ their own distinctive and personal set of guiding principles.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
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The primary source of this guidance is the USAM.110 The USAM 
contains (self-described) comprehensive, internal guidance,111 
organized into nine titles.112 Title 9 of the USAM contains the 
guidelines for U.S. Attorneys in criminal matters, including the 
Principles of Federal Prosecution (Individual Principles).113 
Recognizing that “[t]he manner in which [f]ederal prosecutors exercise 
their decision-making authority has far-reaching implications,” the 
Individual Principles seek to outline considerations for prosecutors in 
the major areas of prosecutorial decisionmaking: prosecuting, 
charging, sentencing, and negotiating plea bargains and 
nonprosecution agreements.114 
Several scholars have surmised that these outlined considerations 
leave something to be desired in terms of guidance, depending on how 
one views the appropriate scope of prosecutorial discretion.115 The 
Individual Principles were first published in 1980, under Attorney 
General Benjamin R. Civiletti,116 seven years before the Sentencing 
Guidelines were originally published.117 Although the Individual 
Principles have since been updated “to reflect changes in the law and 
current policy of [the DOJ],”118 a comprehensive discussion of 
 
 110.  See USAM, supra note 101, §§ 1-1.100–1.200 (stating that the USAM is “intended to be 
comprehensive,” so that if “the [USAM] conflicts with earlier Department statements, except for 
Attorney General’s statements, the [USAM] will control”); Osler, supra note 95, at 633 (“There 
are two national sources for guiding principles for prosecutors who actually try cases, including: 
Directives from the Attorney General and the [USAM] . . . . These two, of course, are mutually 
reinforcing—directives from the Attorney General will presumably be incorporated into the 
[USAM].”).  
 111.  See USAM, supra note 101, §§ 1-1.100–1.200 (stating that “[t]he [USAM] provides only 
internal Department of Justice guidance” and that it is “intended to be comprehensive,” so that 
if “the [USAM] conflicts with earlier Department statements, except for Attorney General’s 
statements, the [USAM] will control”).  
 112.  Id. § 1-1.400.  
 113.  Id. § 9-1.000.  
 114.  Id. § 9-27.110(A).  
 115.  See, e.g., Osler, supra note 95, at 626–27 (“[I]n the end [the DOJ] fails to direct any kind 
of principled, consistent exercise of discretion by hundreds of federal prosecutors. Instead, those 
prosecutors revolve in their own orbits of personal morality, a constellation of independent stars 
and galaxies each with their own hue of light.”).  
 116.  USAM, supra note 101, § 9-27.001.  
 117.  The Sentencing Guidelines were first published in 1987. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 1A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
 118.  USAM, supra note 101, § 9-27.001. Of the updates to the Principles since their 
publication in 1980, perhaps the most notable came in 2003 under Attorney General Ashcroft. 
The Ashcroft memo (subsequently codified at USAM § 9-27.300) established a regime in which 
a prosecutor was obligated to charge an individual with the highest possible charge under the 
circumstances of the case. See generally Caves, supra note 95, at 13–14 (describing this 
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prosecutorial principles and ethics has yet to be published. 
Accordingly, the Individual Principles contain very little discussion of 
principled reasoning, ethical decisionmaking prerogatives, or 
overarching prosecutorial goals for U.S. Attorneys.119 Instead, they 
detail three reasons that a prosecutor should decline to press charges120: 
a prosecutor should not press charges if she decides that “no substantial 
[f]ederal interest would be served,” the individual should be 
prosecuted in another jurisdiction (usually the state), or an “adequate 
non-criminal alternative” exists.121 
Given the amount of discourse on the lack of federal prosecutorial 
guidance, it would seem fitting if the Individual Principles merely 
stated these reasons without any further detail. Yet, that is not the 
case—the next section of the USAM delves into each of the three 
reasons, with a heavy focus on explaining the meaning of “no 
substantial [f]ederal interest.”122 And although principles and ethics are 
not clearly communicated, the explanation of “no substantial [f]ederal 
interest” comes close to delineating a sort of ethical code for U.S. 
Attorneys. The explanation generally guides prosecutors to decide 
whether to press charges by considering the nature and seriousness of 
the violation, the need for deterrence, and the probable sentence, along 
with the individual’s culpability, criminal history, and personal 
circumstances.123 
 
phenomenon). Although tempered by Attorney General Holder in 2010, the guidance to charge 
the highest possible offense still technically obligates federal prosecutors. See Memorandum from 
Att’y Gen. Eric H. Holder to All Fed. Prosecutors, Department Policy on Charging and 
Sentencing (May 19, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/
holder-memo-charging-sentencing.pdf [https://perma.cc/MW9E-5MUY] (noting that the 
determination of the highest possible charge should be “made in the context” of an individual 
defendant’s personal circumstances).  
 119.  See generally USAM, supra note 101, §§ 9-27.000–27.250 (discussing the considerations 
which federal prosecutors should take into account when deciding whether to press charges); see 
also Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, supra note 118 (same). 
 120.  USAM, supra note 101, § 9-27.220(A). These reasons assume that the prospective 
defendant has violated a federal law and the prosecutor believes the admissible evidence is 
“sufficient” to bring a successful case against the defendant. Id.  
 121.  Id.  
 122.  Id. §§ 9-27.220–27.250.  
 123.  Id. § 9-27.230(B). As noted above, the adequacy of the Principles regarding 
prosecutorial discretion has been a subject of debate since their promulgation. See, e.g., Osler, 
supra note 95, at 626–34 (discussing the shortcomings of the Principles—in particular, ethical 
guidelines for prosecution). Different scholars have expressed different opinions about the 
published rules. Leslie Donavan opines:  
[T]he Justice Department’s published rules, while a slight improvement over the 
previously inconsistent procedural and substantive decision-making process employed 
by federal prosecutors, are too general and permissive to achieve the desired level of 
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This discussion is actually the closest thing to an ethical code that 
federal prosecutors have in charging individuals. By executive order, 
each federal agency is responsible for regulating its own ethical 
standards.124 The ethical standards for federal prosecutors are 
accordingly referenced by the USAM;125 however, none of the 
referenced standards are actually specific to prosecution.126 The 
USAM mentions the American Bar Association’s ethical standards for 
prosecutors, but because the DOJ has not adopted them, they are 
referenced only as guidelines with which “familiariz[ation]” is 
recommended.127 
This lack of a distinct ethical guideline is likely by design. The 
DOJ has explicitly stated that the Individual Principles are not 
intended to “require a particular prosecutorial decision in any given 
case.”128 One reason that the DOJ may not want to publish a more 
detailed set of discretionary guidelines is the possibility that such 
guidelines would open up prosecutorial discretion to enhanced review 
or novel civil suits. 
However, a middle ground exists. Demonstrated by the relatively 
recently published federal standards for prosecuting corporate entities, 
the DOJ can issue an office memorandum updating the Individual 
Principles to include further principled guidance for charging 
 
consistency and even-handedness in applying the criminal law to citizens at the state 
and local level. Thus, they and the proposals upon which the guidelines are modeled 
should not serve as prototypes for much needed local prosecutorial guidelines. 
Leslie Donavan, Comment, Justice Department’s Prosecution Guidelines of Little Value to State 
and Local Prosecutors, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 955, 958 (1981) (citation omitted). 
 124.  See USAM, supra note 101, § 1-4.010 (summarizing the purpose of Executive Order 
11,222, which was superseded by Executive Order 12,731 on October 17, 1990); Exec. Order No. 
12,731, 55 Fed. Reg. 42,547 (Oct. 17, 1990) (directing agency heads to regulate ethical standards 
specific to their agencies).  
 125.  USAM, supra note 101, § 1-4.000.  
 126.  See Office of Gov’t Ethics, Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive 
Branch, 5 C.F.R. pt. 2635 (2015) (regulating all executive branch employee behavior regarding 
general conflicts of interest, required financial disclosures, and responsibilities for the 
administration of the executive branch ethics program); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Human Resources 
Order DOJ 1200.1: Chapter 11-1, Procedures for Complying with Ethics Requirements (Sept. 12, 
2003), https://www.justice.gov/jmd/hr-order-doj-12001-part-11-ethics [https://perma.cc/A9WU-
GMRN] (providing general procedures for complying with the OGE standards within the DOJ). 
 127.  USAM, supra note 101, § 9-2.101; see CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE 
PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (outlining special ethical considerations 
for prosecutorial charging discretion).  
 128.  USAM, supra note 101, § 9-27.120(B); see DAN K. WEBB, ROBERT W. TARUN, & 
STEVEN F. MOLO, CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS § 16.04[1] at 16-11 (1993) (“The 
government took pains to disclaim any notion that the Principles would be binding and 
enforceable against [the DOJ] in the case of non-compliance.”). 
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decisions, while sacrificing neither prosecutorial flexibility nor 
decisionmaking authority. 
B. Charging Corporations with Federal Crimes 
When charging corporations with crimes, the DOJ’s guidance for 
federal prosecutors is both more detailed and more revised than the 
guidance for cases of individual crimes. In fact, one scholar has 
remarked that “in no other area [than corporate crime] do federal 
prosecutors provide such detailed guidelines to explain and to limit 
(albeit in a non-binding way) how they exercise their discretion . . . . 
Nor are there comparable areas in which prosecutors so frequently 
make revisions to guidelines that constrain their own discretion.”129 
The DOJ first published the Principles of Federal Prosecution of 
Business Organizations (Business Principles) in the USAM in 2008,130 
almost three decades after the Individual Principles were published.131 
The Business Principles had their start almost a decade prior to that, 
however, with a memorandum written by then–Deputy Attorney 
General Eric Holder (known as the “Holder memo”).132 The memo 
was drafted in response to complaints of a lack of uniformity in the 
charging of corporations.133 It outlined eight factors (the “Holder 
factors”) for prosecutors to consider when deciding whether to bring 
charges against a corporate entity, including the “pervasiveness of 
wrongdoing” in the corporation, any history of similar conduct by the 
 
 129.  Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1796 
(2011). 
 130.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Revises Charging Guidelines 
for Prosecuting Corporate Fraud (Aug. 28, 2008), https:justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/August/ 
08-odag-757.html [https://perma.cc/8N73-XPEA]. 
 131.  The Individual Principles were first published in 1980. USAM, supra note 101, § 9-
27.001.  
 132.  Beth A. Wilkinson & Alex Young K. Oh, The Principles of Federal Prosecution of 
Business Organizations: A Ten-Year Anniversary Perspective, NYSBA INSIDE, Fall 2009, at 8. 
The Business Principles were originally titled “Federal Prosecution of Corporations,” in 
accordance with the title of the Holder memo. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Deputy Att’y 
Gen. to All Component Heads and U.S. Att’ys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations 
(June 16, 1999). Most often though, they were simply referred to as the “Holder memo.” The title 
change came in 2003, with the first round of revisions to the Business Principles. See infra note 
138.  
 133.  Attorney General Holder revealed this motivation to the Wall Street Journal in 2006. 
See Peter Lattman, The Holder Memo and Its Progeny, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2006), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/12/13/the-holder-memo [https://perma.cc/9NME-BZD3].  
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corporation, and the corporation’s cooperation with the prosecution.134 
Notably, factor seven was based on the “collateral consequences” of 
bringing criminal charges against a corporation, “including 
disproportionate harm to shareholders and employees not proven 
personally culpable.”135 
Though the Holder memo went into effect without contention, it 
soon became the topic of much debate in the wake of the shocking 
unravelings of corporate behemoths such as Enron and WorldCom.136 
As a result, then–Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson updated 
the Holder memo’s guidance with his own memorandum in 2003 
(known as the “Thompson memo”).137 The Thompson memo revised 
the Holder factors, primarily focusing on the “authenticity” of 
corporate cooperation with the DOJ in the face of allegations of 
wrongdoing,138 and added a factor to be considered by prosecutors 
while deciding whether to charge a corporation.139 It also made the 
consideration of these factors (which would eventually become the 
Business Principles) mandatory for all federal prosecutors.140 
 
 134.  Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, supra note 132. Of course, application of the 
Business Principles works in tandem with application of the Individual Principles, which apply to 
all federal prosecutions. See USAM, supra note 101, § 9-28.300 (Factors to Be Considered) 
(“Generally, prosecutors apply the same factors in determining whether to charge a corporation 
as they do with respect to individuals. Thus, the prosecutor must weigh all of the factors normally 
considered in the sound exercise of prosecutorial judgment . . . .” (citations omitted)).  
 135.  Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, supra note 132. 
 136.  See Erik Paulsen, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate Prosecution 
Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1449–50 (2007) (noting that the Holder memo was 
“released . . . without much fanfare” because, in 1999, “the United States was experiencing 
unprecedented business prosperity, and corporate prosecution was hardly en vogue”; however, 
this all changed following the well-publicized discovery of a series of corporate scandals). 
 137.  See id. at 1450 (“In response to this wave of business crime, the DOJ reprioritized the 
prosecution of corporate entities. The Thompson Memo, the most significant of the three Deputy 
Attorney General memos, was released in early 2003 as part of this renewed DOJ effort.”); 
Wilkinson & Oh, supra note 130, at 8 (“The first-revised Principles, issued by then-Deputy 
Attorney General Larry D. Thompson in 2003 . . . came on the heels of the Enron and WorldCom 
scandals . . . .”). 
 138.  Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. Larry D. Thompson to Heads of Dep’t 
Components and U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 
20, 2003) (“The main focus of the revisions is increased emphasis on and scrutiny of the 
authenticity of a corporation’s cooperation.”).  
 139.  See id. (adding “the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the 
corporation’s malfeasance” to the factors to be considered by prosecutors in charging a corporate 
entity).  
 140.  See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that the 
Thompson memo was binding on all federal prosecutors, while the Holder memo had merely 
been advisory).  
AMSLER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/21/2016  3:20 PM 
192 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:169 
The changes to the Holder factors prompted by the Thompson 
memo generated lengthy debate, criticism, and proposed legislation.141 
The majority of the debate surrounded the “corporate cooperation” 
factor.142 Although little change existed between the literal discussions 
of this factor in the Holder and Thompson memos, the general policies 
of the Thompson memo were interpreted as implicitly encouraging 
prosecutors to request attorney-client privilege waivers as a condition 
of corporate cooperation.143 Eventually, the DOJ responded to these 
concerns.144 In 2006, then–Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty 
published another memorandum updating the guidance to prosecutors 
(known as the “McNulty memo”).145 The McNulty memo “expand[ed] 
upon [the DOJ’s] long-standing policies concerning how [to] evaluate 
the authenticity of a corporation’s cooperation”146 by announcing that 
corporations need not waive attorney-client and work product 
protections to gain credit for cooperating with prosecutors.147 
However, the McNulty updates to the Holder factors did not end 
the debate,148 and two additional memoranda have since been 
 
 141.  See generally Julie R. O’Sullivan, Does DOJ’s Privilege Waiver Policy Threaten the 
Rationales Underlying the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine? A Preliminary 
“No,” 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1237, 1238–43 (2008) (discussing the evolution of DOJ policy 
regarding corporate attorney-client privilege waivers as a result of the vigorous opposition of 
white-collar defense practitioners to the lasting practical implications of the Thompson memo). 
O’Sullivan uses this discussion as the backdrop for her primary argument, which is that attorney-
client privilege is “virtually the last means by which corporations can resist government efforts to 
impose potentially ruinous liability on corporate actors, whether or not such consequences are 
warranted. . . . [This] account[s] for the bar’s full-throated roar in objection to DOJ policy.” Id. at 
1251. 
 142.  Id. at 1238–43. 
 143.  Id. at 1240.  
 144.  See Wilkinson & Oh, supra note 130, at 9 (“In response to these judicial and legislative 
rebukes, then-Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty revised the Principles in 2006 . . . .”). 
 145.  Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. Paul J. McNulty to Heads of Dep’t Components 
and U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (2006); Paulsen, 
supra note 136, at 1451 (“In December 2006, the DOJ replaced the Thompson Memo with the 
McNulty Memo . . . .”).  
 146.  Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, supra note 145, at 2.  
 147.  See id. at 8 (“Waiver of attorney-client and work product protections is not a 
prerequisite to a finding that a company has cooperated in the government’s investigation.”).  
 148.  See, e.g., O’Sullivan, supra note 141, at 1241 (“The ink was barely dry on the McNulty 
Memo before American Bar Association President Karen J. Mathis issued a press release stating 
that these guidelines ‘fall far short of what is needed to prevent further erosion of fundamental 
attorney-client privilege, work product, and employee protections during government 
investigations.’” (citation omitted)). 
AMSLER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/21/2016  3:20 PM 
2016] LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD 193 
published by the DOJ.149 In 2008, then–Deputy Attorney General 
Mark Filip published an update to the Holder factors (known as the 
“Filip memo”) focusing on “what measures a business entity must take 
to qualify for the long-recognized ‘cooperation’ mitigating factor,”150 
definitively clarifying that official DOJ policy bars prosecutors from 
asking for waivers of attorney-client privilege.151 Nonetheless, some 
scholars and commentators have argued that, despite the Filip memo’s 
compelling language, nothing has actually changed in the practice of 
investigating corporations: cooperation (in any real sense) still 
practically requires corporations to waive their privilege and let their 
attorneys divulge otherwise-confidential facts to prosecutors.152  
The Filip memo also announced that, moving forward, the Holder 
factors would be included in the USAM, partly as a symbol of their 
stability and continuity.153 Thus, the Business Principles were 
instituted, almost ten years after the Holder factors were originally 
published. The most recent updates to these Principles come from a 
2015 memorandum published by Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates 
(known as the “Yates memo”).154 The Yates memo, for the first time in 
over a decade, moved away from the focus on attorney-client privilege 
waivers to emphasize “seeking accountability from the individuals who 
 
 149.  Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. Mark Filip to Heads of Dep’t Components and 
U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008); 
Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. Sally Quillian Yates to the Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust 
Div., et al., Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015).  
 150.  Memorandum from Mark Filip, supra note 149, at 1. 
 151.  See id. at 9 (“[P]rosecutors should not ask for such waivers [of attorney-client privilege] 
and are directed not to do so.”); see also Wilkinson & Oh, supra note 130, at 9 (“The [Filip 
memo] . . . completely removed consideration of a waiver of the attorney-client privilege and the 
payment of employees’ legal fees as factors in corporate charging decisions.”).  
 152.  See Mark J. Stein & Joshua A. Levine, The Filip Memorandum: Does It Go Far 
Enough?, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 10, 2008), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/ id=1202424398325/The-
Filip-Memorandum-Does-It-Go-Far-Enough? [https://perma.cc/8YKG-YU6X] (“The thrust of 
the Filip Memo is that DOJ simply wants the facts . . . . The obvious problem is that the ‘facts’ 
uncovered in an internal investigation are actually an attorney’s distillation of numerous 
interviews and documents and therefore [privileged] work product.”).  
 153.  See Memorandum from Mark Filip, supra note 149, at 1. The memo states:  
[E]arlier practice has drawn criticism from some quarters for implying that Department 
policy is subject to revision with every changing of the guard. Accordingly, these 
Principles please should henceforth be referred to as the Department’s “Principles of 
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations,” or the “Corporate Prosecution 
Principles,” or by the relevant section of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, as other sections 
typically are.  
Id. at 2; see also USAM, supra note 101, § 9-28.000 (containing the USAM publication of the 
“Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations”).  
 154.  Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, supra note 149. 
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perpetrated the wrongdoing” in corporate misconduct cases.155 
Nonetheless, the same essential factors that federal prosecutors 
consider in deciding whether to charge a corporate entity with a crime 
remain unchanged,156 the vast bulk of which survived from the original 
Holder memo in 1999.157 
IV.  GUIDANCE MATTERS FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS 
A. Shaping Federal Prosecutions Through Charging Guidance 
An examination of prosecutions shows a major difference in the 
way that individuals and corporations are charged with crimes. Far 
more often than in cases of individual crimes, corporations guilty of 
criminal conduct will be offered deferred prosecution agreements 
(DPAs).158 These agreements, “essentially . . . probationary 
agreement[s] [where] the government files some kind of criminal 
charge . . . but then agrees to hold the charge open as long as the 
[defendant] successfully fulfills the terms of the agreement,”159 allow 
corporations to avoid the consequences of federal prosecution. 
For example, in 2009, Toyota was forced to recall millions of 
vehicles after a deadly car accident revealed massive safety concerns 
with vehicle design.160 Investigations eventually uncovered that 
“unintended acceleration” had cost the lives of eighty-nine people 
 
 155.  Id. at 1; see id. at 2 (“[T]his memo is designed to ensure that all attorneys across the 
Department are consistent in our best efforts to hold to account the individuals responsible for 
illegal corporate conduct.”).  
 156.  USAM, supra note 101, § 9-28.300(A). Although the factors remain the same, the 2015 
updates to the Business Principles prompted by the Yates memo included the splitting of the 
former factor (A)(4) (“the cooperation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its 
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents”) into two separate factors, now (A)(4) 
(“the corporation’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents”) and (A)(6) (“the 
corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing”). Id. 
 157.  See id. § 9-28.300(A) (listing the ten factors that prosecutors should consider in reaching 
a decision as to whether to bring charges against an entity); see also supra note 134 and 
accompanying text.  
 158.  See infra notes 232–41 and accompanying text. 
 159.  Paulsen, supra note 136, at 1438. 
 160.  Danielle Douglas & Michael A. Fletcher, Toyota Reaches $1.2 Billion Settlement to End 
Probe of Accelerator Problems, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/business/economy/toyota-reaches-12-billion-settlement-to-end-criminal-probe/2014/03/19/
5738a3c4-af69-11e3-9627-c65021d6d572_story.html [https://perma.cc/6747-9W3W]. The deadly 
car accident that precipitated the vehicle recall involved a California Highway Patrol Officer and 
three of his family members, “speeding out of control in a Lexus at more than 125 mph before the 
car crashed, killing all four occupants.” Id.  
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driving Toyota vehicles.161 To make matters worse, Toyota lied about 
the cause of the unintended acceleration by claiming that the design 
defect resulted from poorly designed floor mats that “trapped” gas 
pedals.162 Toyota knew, but kept to itself, a second, more likely cause 
of the deadly car accidents: “sticky” pedals.163 
Toyota had been notified about a problem with their pedals more 
than a year prior, but had chosen not to disclose the information to 
U.S. manufacturers and authorities.164 During the 2009 recall, they tried 
to conceal their fatal error by only supplying information about 
defective floor mats and falsifying timelines to make it seem as if they 
had only just become aware of a potential issue with their pedals.165 
Had Toyota acted lawfully and revealed information regarding the 
sticky pedals to U.S. authorities right away, lives might have been 
saved. 
Yet, despite Toyota’s deadly (in)actions, criminal cover-up, and 
the deaths of eighty-nine people, the federal prosecution against 
Toyota wrapped up last year with only a DPA.166 Why? Arguably, one 
reason is that the Business Principles contain a wider range of flexible 
guidelines and detailed criteria for prosecutors than do the Individual 
Principles. The Business Principles’ guidance for prosecutors deciding 
whether to charge a corporation is roughly twice the length of the same 
guidance in the Individual Principles.167 Correspondingly, leading 
 
 161.  Toyota ‘Unintended Acceleration’ Has Killed 89, CBS NEWS (May 25, 2010), http:// 
www.cbsnews.com/news/toyota-unintended-acceleration-has-killed-89 [https://perma.cc/DJK6-
RYJW].  
 162.  Douglas & Fletcher, supra note 160.  
 163.  See id. (“Toyota knew that models it had not recalled had similar floor-mat 
problems . . . . Also, the company hid from federal regulators a second cause of unintended 
acceleration in its vehicles: a sticky gas pedal.”). The sticky pedals were “caused by plastic 
material inside the pedal that could cause the accelerator to become stuck in a partially depressed 
position.” Id.; see also Exhibit C, Statement of Facts at 4–5, United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 
2014 WL 10584763 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2014) (No.14-CRIM-186), http://www.justice.gov/ 
sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2014/03/19/toyota-stmt-facts.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BGQ-SWCE] 
[hereinafter DOJ Toyota Facts] (accompanying the Deferred Prosecution Agreement and 
describing Toyota’s advance knowledge of the pedal defect in more detail).  
 164.  See DOJ Toyota Facts, supra note 163, at 4–5 (describing Toyota’s advance knowledge 
of the pedal defect). 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Toyota could have been prosecuted for wire fraud, but the DOJ chose to present Toyota 
with a DPA. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 2014 
WL 10584763 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2014) (No.14-CRIM-186), http://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/opa/legacy/2014/03/19/toyota-def-pros-agr.pdf [https://perma.cc/PDT6-7FTC].  
 167.  The Business Principles’ guidance for prosecutors deciding whether to press charges 
against a corporation is contained in USAM sections 9-28.200 to 9-28.1300, approximately sixteen 
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scholar Brandon Garrett has stated that corporations are punished 
“[n]ot by relying on strict and narrow sentencing guidelines, as with 
individuals, but by using more flexible guidelines that may give the 
biggest fish the best deals.”168 
Most notably, the Business Principles guide federal prosecutors to 
consider the collateral effects of prosecuting business entities.169 The 
Business Principles devote an entire section170 to listing the extralegal 
consequences that a prosecutor may want to consider, including effects 
on innocent third parties and other sanctions that might accompany the 
criminal charge.171 In contrast, the Individual Principles mention 
collateral consequences exactly one time, with no depth or discussion, 
and only in reference to evaluating whether another jurisdiction could 
prosecute an individual more effectively.172 
 
printed pages. The Individual Principles’ guidance for prosecutors deciding whether to press 
charges against an individual defendant is contained in USAM sections 9-27.200 to 9-27.260, 
approximately eight printed pages.  
 168.  BRANDON GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH 
CORPORATIONS 14 (2014). Garrett goes on to explain that large firms “often receive deferred 
prosecution agreements and pay lower fines, if any: 47 percent of those getting deferred 
prosecution or non-prosecution agreements paid no fine at all” and that “[a]lmost every time 
prosecutors explained how a fine was calculated, it was at the very bottom, or quite a bit below 
the bottom, of the range suggested in the sentencing guidelines.” Id. 
 169.  USAM, supra note 101, § 9-28.1100 (Collateral Consequences).  
 170.  This section is approximately one page in length of the sixteen pages of guidance in the 
Business Principles for prosecutors deciding whether to press charges against a corporation. See 
supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 171.  USAM, supra note 101, § 9-28.1100(B) This comment states: 
In the corporate context, prosecutors may take into account the possibly substantial 
consequences to a corporation’s employees, investors, pensioners, and customers, 
many of whom may, depending on the size and nature of the corporation and their role 
in its operations, have played no role in the criminal conduct, have been unaware of it, 
or have been unable to prevent it. Prosecutors should also be aware of non-penal 
sanctions that may accompany a criminal charge, such as potential suspension or 
debarment from eligibility for government contracts or federally funded programs such 
as health care programs. 
Id. 
 172.  See generally USAM, supra note 101, § 9-27.000. The sole mention of collateral 
consequences in the Individual Principles reads: “[The prosecutor] should also be alert to the 
possibility that a conviction under state law may, in some cases result in collateral consequences 
for the defendant, such as disbarment, that might not follow upon a conviction under [f]ederal 
law.” Id. § 9-27.240(B)(3). In the “substantial federal interest” factors in section 9-27.230, factor 
(A)(7) (“[t]he probable sentence or other consequences if the person is convicted”) seems to 
contemplate a discussion of collateral consequences; however, such discussion is missing from the 
elaboration of factor (A)(7) in section 9-27.230(B)(8). Id. § 9-27.230. These discussions leave 
much to be desired—collateral consequences exist for individual convictions as much as they do 
for corporate convictions. See infra Part V.A.  
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This is a significant difference. A line-by-line comparison of the 
factors listed for consideration in the Individual and Business 
Principles shows that most of the Business Principles factors are either 
very similar to the Individual Principles173 or inapplicable in the 
individual context.174 Of the three factors that do not fall into these 
categories,175 the consideration of collateral consequences is not only 
the most relevant to the prosecution of individuals, it is also the factor 
with the best chance of having a meaningful effect on the current 
federal criminal regime. 
B. Limiting Federal Prosecutions Through Charging Guidance 
Between 2004 and 2014, corporate prosecutions decreased by a 
remarkable 29 percent,176 with the most substantial decline coming 
 
 173.  Compare USAM, supra note 101, § 9-27.220(A)(3) (instructing that prosecutors should 
decline to prosecute cases if “[t]here exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution”), 
with id. § 9-28.300(A)(9) (requiring prosecutors to consider “the adequacy of remedies such as 
civil or regulatory enforcement actions” when deciding whether to criminally charge a 
corporation); compare id. § 9-27.230(A)(2) (requiring prosecutors to consider “[t]he nature and 
seriousness of the offense”), with id. § 9-28.300(A)(1) (requiring prosecutors to consider “the 
nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of harm to the public, and applicable 
policies and priorities, if any, governing the prosecution of corporations for particular categories 
of crime” when weighing whether to criminally prosecute a corporation); compare id. § 9-
27.230(A)(4) (requiring prosecutors to consider “[t]he person’s culpability in connection with the 
offense”), with id. § 9-28.300(A)(2) (requiring prosecutors to consider “the pervasiveness of 
wrongdoing within the corporation, including the complicity in, or the condoning of, the 
wrongdoing by corporate management”); compare id. § 9-27.230(A)(5) (requiring prosecutors to 
consider “[t]he person’s history with respect to criminal activity”), with id. § 9-28.300(A)(3) 
(requiring prosecutors to consider “the corporation’s history of similar misconduct, including 
prior criminal, civil, and regulatory enforcement actions against it”); compare id. § 9-27.230(A)(6) 
(requiring prosecutors to consider “[t]he person’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation or 
prosecution of others”), with id. § 9-28.300(A)(4) (requiring prosecutors to consider “the 
corporation’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents”). 
 174.  Id. §§ 9-28.300(A)(5), (A)(10).  
 175.  The three factors left include: USAM sections 9-28.300(A)(6) (“timely and voluntary 
disclosure of wrongdoing” by the defendant), (A)(7) (“remedial actions” taken), and (A)(8) 
(“collateral consequences” of prosecution). Id. § 9-28.300. 
 176.  TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DATA 
REVEAL 29 PERCENT DROP IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS OF CORPORATIONS, at tbl.1 
(Corporate Prosecutions Filed, FY 2004–2014) (Oct. 13, 2015), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/ 
crim/406 [https://perma.cc/3YZE-LZM4] [hereinafter TRAC CORPORATE DATA]. This data 
tracks corporate charges and convictions from 2004 until 2014, and is available only as a result of 
a case-by-case records search completed by Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse 
(TRAC), following a seventeen-year litigation effort under the Freedom of Information Act to 
gain access to the information. Id. Compiled data for the number of corporate charges brought 
prior to 2004 is limited. The USSC publishes the annual number of corporate convictions in its 
Sourcebook, but these numbers do not include unsuccessful prosecutions, and thus are not a 
conclusive source for the total number of corporate prosecutions filed. See id. at tbl.2 
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after the Business Principles were finally published in the USAM in 
2008.177 Similarly, corporate convictions have also decreased on 
average.178 Data shows an all-time high of 304 convictions in 2000, 
followed by a drop to an all-time low of 130 after the publication of the 
Thompson memo in 2003, to a relative low of 162 in 2014 (see Figure 1 
below).179  
Figure 1. Corporate Criminal Convictions180 
 
 
(Corporations Convicted of Federal Crimes FY 1996–2014); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
ANNUAL REPORTS & SOURCEBOOKS ARCHIVES, http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-
publications/annual-reports-sourcebooks/annual-reports-sourcebooks-archives 
[https://perma.cc/W6MY-59VB]. Furthermore, some scholars have reported that the information 
available from the USSC is limited in other ways, including missing and incomplete data for 
corporate prosecutions generally. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 129, at 1805 (“[T]he Commission’s 
datasheets are missing data important to the questions examined [in this article]. Problems with 
Commission data have apparently been longstanding. . . . A landmark 1999 study. . . . warned 
future researchers to ‘proceed with caution before drawing inferences’ from the Commission’s 
organizational convictions data, where the Commission itself had acknowledged that its data ‘are 
neither comprehensive nor representative.’” (quoting Cindy Alexander, Jennifer Arlen & Mark 
A. Cohen, Regulating Corporate Criminal Sanctions: Federal Guidelines and the Sentencing of 
Public Firms, 42 J.L. & ECON. 393, 402 & n.26 (1999))).  
 177.  TRAC CORPORATE DATA, supra note 176, at tbl.1; see also id. at tbl.5 (Corporate 
Referrals, Prosecutions Filed and Convictions—Before and After Filip Guidelines).  
 178.  Id. at tbl.1. 
 179.  See id. at fig.2 (Corporations Convicted of Federal Crimes, FY 1996–2014) (data sourced 
from USSC Sourcebooks). But see supra note 176 and accompanying text for discussion of 
potential USSC data shortfalls. 
 180. TRAC CORPORATE DATA, supra note 176, at fig.2 (chart recreated for formatting; 
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These numbers can be contrasted with the number of individual 
convictions over the past decade, which has remained above 91 percent 
of the prosecutions pursued since 2000, and above 92 percent since 
2006.181 The rate of individual convictions further increased between 
2008 and 2011, rising to 93 percent.182 Individual prosecutions over the 
past decade followed a similar pattern, increasing by 9 percent from 
2008 until 2011 (see Figure 2 below).183 The number of individual 
prosecutions began decreasing in 2012,184 but this has been largely 
attributed to recent policies that are directly tied to the current 
administration.185 These recent policies include disfavoring nonviolent 
drug offender186 and felony immigration prosecutions.187 Whether these 
 
 181.  Data found in the U.S. Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Reports for the fiscal years of 2000 
through 2013. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATT’YS, ANNUAL STATISTICAL 
REPORTS, https://www.justice.gov/usao/resources/annual-statistical-reports [https://perma.cc/
62E8-ESXL].  
 182.  Id. 
 183.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATT’YS, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL 
STATISTICAL REPORT 7–8 (Fiscal Year 2013), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/ 
legacy/2014/09/22/13statrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/AD83-H438] [hereinafter DOJ FY13 REPORT].  
 184.  Id. 
 185.  See David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27, 
44–49 (2011) (discussing the link between the recent criminal-justice reform overtures and the 
present budgetary constraints, and doubting whether the reform mindset will remain once the 
budget changes with a new administration); Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 
88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1105 (2013) (“While the nation’s appetite for incarceration appears to be 
waning, state, local, and federal criminal justice systems continue to adjudicate millions of cases 
annually, and little reason exists to conclude that criminal prosecution and conviction will abate 
as the preferred public response to misconduct.” (citations omitted)); Jeffrey A. Tucker, Obama 
Starts Winding Down the U.S. Prison State—And About Time, Too, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 19, 2015), 
http://www.newsweek.com/obama-starts-winding-down-us-prison-state-and-about-time-too-
381172 [https://perma.cc/N9VJ-79VT] (discussing President Obama’s efforts at prison reform in 
the last years of his presidency). 
 186.  See, e.g., Richard A. Serrano & Ian Duncan, Federal Authorities Eased up on Drug Cases 
in 2014, BALT. SUN (Feb. 13, 2015, 3:40 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/federal-
workplace/bs-md-federal-drug-cases-20150217-story.html [https://perma.cc/9NAM-48CU] 
(discussing Attorney General Eric Holder’s comments on easing prison overcrowding through 
the new DOJ policies which started in 2013, and the resulting decrease in federal prosecutions).  
 187.  See, e.g., Dan Cadman, Immigration Prosecutions’ Five-Year Trend Downward, 
Particularly in the Interior, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES (Apr. 10, 2015), 
http://cis.org/cadman/immigration-prosecutions-five-year-trend-downward-particularly-interior 
[https://perma.cc/5NS2-V2PN]; see also TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, 
IMMIGRATION PROSECUTIONS FOR SEPTEMBER 2015 (Oct. 27, 2015), http://trac.syr.edu/
traceports/bulletins/immigration/monthlysep15/fil [https://perma.cc/2SEX-B94X].  
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policies will continue with the next administration remains an open 
question.188 
Figure 2. Individual Criminal Charges189 
 
V. LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD 
A. Guidance for Considering Collateral Consequences 
Based on the data above, the institution of the Holder factors and, 
to an even larger extent, the publication of the Business Principles has 
had a curtailing effect on the federal prosecution of corporate crime.190 
This curtailing effect was both purposely intended and stabilized by the 
publication of the Business Principles in the USAM. Thus, the numbers 
of prosecutions and convictions of corporations have decreased, even 
as the same numbers have increased for individuals.191 The major 
differences between the Individual Principles and the Business 
Principles (or lack thereof) demonstrate that the discussion of 
collateral consequences in the Business Principles is at least partially 
responsible for this difference.192 Thus, the crucial question becomes: 
 
 188.  See supra note 185 and accompanying text. Thus, these administration-specific policies, 
currently serving to curb individual prosecutions, cannot be compared to the curbing guidance 
instituted by the Business Principles, which were made stable and permanent by publication in 
the USAM in 2008. See supra Part III.B. 
 189.  DOJ FY13 REPORT, supra note 183, at 8 (Criminal Chart 2.1—Criminal Cases Filed) 
(chart recreated for formatting; original made by U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for 
U.S. Attorneys based on DOJ data).  
 190.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 191.  See supra Part IV.B. 
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Why consider the collateral consequences of charging corporations 
with crimes but not those of charging individuals with crimes? 
In reference to considering the collateral consequences of 
prosecuting a corporation, the Business Principles state, “[P]rosecutors 
may take into account the possibly substantial consequences to a 
corporation’s employees, investors, pensioners, and customers, many 
of whom may . . . have played no role in the criminal conduct.”193 The 
Business Principles go on to add that “[p]rosecutors should also be 
aware of non-penal sanctions that may accompany a criminal charge, 
such as potential suspension or debarment from eligibility for 
government contracts.”194 Thus, according to the USAM, the official 
reasons for considering the collateral consequences of charging 
corporations with crimes stem from concerns for innocent third parties 
and fears about the economy as a whole.195  
The DOJ began to officially consider the collateral consequences 
of prosecuting businesses with the Holder memo, after the corporate 
scandals of the 1980s and 1990s.196 However, the DOJ’s focus on these 
collateral consequences intensified after the collapse of Arthur 
Andersen, and many scholars theorize that it was this event which 
solidified the importance of collateral consequences in the DOJ’s 
 
 193.  USAM, supra note 101, § 9-28.1100(B).  
 194.  Id. 
 195.  DOJ officials supporting the consideration of collateral consequences in the context of 
corporate criminal charges have also stressed these factors. For example, in 2012, the Assistant 
Attorney General remarked:  
[I]n reaching every charging decision, we must take into account the effect of an 
indictment on innocent employees and shareholders . . . . I personally feel that it’s my 
duty to consider whether individual employees with no responsibility for, or knowledge 
of, misconduct committed by others in the same company are going to lose their 
livelihood if we indict the corporation . . . . And, in some cases, the health of an industry 
or the markets are a real factor. Those are the kinds of considerations in [corporate] 
crime cases that literally keep me up at night, and which must play a role in responsible 
enforcement. 
Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the New York City Bar 
Association (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/crm-speech-
1209131.html [https://perma.cc/KQZ7-UYSV]. Scholars have also noted these concerns. See 
generally John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry 
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 400–02, 407–08 (1981) 
(describing various “externalities” attaching to corporate prosecutions).  
 196.  See supra Part III.B; see also Sharon E. Foster, Too Big to Prosecute: Collateral 
Consequences, Systemic Institutions and the Rule of Law, 34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 655, 664 
(2015) (“[F]ollowing the savings and loan crisis of the 1980’s and the Enron scandal in 2001, the 
DOJ adopted a written policy of taking collateral consequences into consideration in deciding 
whether to bring criminal charges against systemic institutions.”). 
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corporate charging policy.197 In fact, Arthur Andersen’s collapse, and 
the subsequent attention that the DOJ paid to collateral consequences 
in the corporate crime context, has been dubbed “the Andersen 
effect.”198 
But the consequences of prosecuting businesses are not alone in 
having collateral effects. Just like criminal convictions of corporations, 
criminal convictions of individuals affect “far more than the convicted 
individual.”199 The DOJ itself recognizes that “almost every conviction 
of an individual[] will have an impact on innocent third parties.”200 So, 
the collateral consequences of prosecuting individuals clearly 
encompasses the first concern of the DOJ when prosecuting 
corporations: innocent third parties. What about the DOJ’s second 
concern, the economy as a whole? 
When it comes to individual prosecutions, the effects on innocent 
third parties cannot be separated from the harm caused to the economy 
as a whole. Federal and state convicts, and their families, face 
consequences of conviction including increased health concerns, social 
stigma, licensing bans, housing restrictions, and a lack of employment 
prospects.201 When viewed at the individual level, these effects of 
incarceration may seem less weighty than the collateral effects of 
prosecuting a corporation. However, such a perspective would be 
shortsighted. 
This is primarily because “too many Americans” are in prison.202 
With the number of individual incarcerations propelled to mass levels 
in recent decades,203 the collateral consequences of conviction have 
 
 197.  See, e.g., Foster, supra note 196, at 662 (“The job losses from the closure of Arthur 
Andersen and other economic impact factors created some concern and facilitated the changed 
policy at the DOJ to consider collateral consequences, but only for systemically important 
institutions.”). 
 198.  Alex B. Heller, Corporate Death Penalty: Prosecutorial Discretion and the Indictment of 
SAC Capital, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 763, 770 (2015).  
 199.  Logan, supra note 185, at 1108. Logan goes on to explain that family and friends of 
convicts frequently must endure “spill-over” effects of a loved one’s incarceration like stigma, 
violence, and disdain, in addition to serious health and financial issues. Id. at 1108–09; see also 
supra Part I.B.  
 200.  USAM, supra note 101, § 9-28.1100(B). 
 201.  See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text; see also supra note 172 and accompanying 
text. 
 202.  See supra Part I.B. 
 203.  Id.; see also Henderson, supra note 58, at 105–07. 
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resulted in cyclical poverty,204 inequality,205 and reinforced criminal 
behavior.206 Each of these results has constituted a prime contributor 
to present-day social-justice breakdowns.207 For example, a recent 
economics study showed that being incarcerated for a felony (a time 
period of a year or more) “reduce[d] the odds of post-prison 
employment by 24 percent and increase[d] the odds of living on food 
stamps by 5 percent.”208 Furthermore, some research has shown that 
the longer an individual is incarcerated, the greater the chance that the 
individual will turn to crime when finally released from prison.209 These 
and other difficulties have led scholars to conclude that America’s mass 
incarceration epidemic has “produced a new social group” of convicts 
and former convicts who have been cast out from society.210 This social 
divide is especially prevalent with regard to racially disadvantaged 
 
 204.  See Coates, supra note 59 (“It is estimated that between 30 and 50 percent of all parolees 
in Los Angeles and San Francisco are homeless. In that context—employment prospects 
diminished, cut off from one’s children, nowhere to live—one can readily see the difficulty of 
eluding the ever-present grasp of incarceration . . . .”); Stephanos Bibas, The Truth about Mass 
Incarceration, NAT’L REV. (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/424059/mass-
incarceration-prison-reform [https://perma.cc/E3CN-PEXY] (“[P]rison does much to draw 
inmates away from lawful work. In the month before their arrest, roughly three quarters of 
inmates were employed, earning the bulk of their income lawfully. . . . helping to pay for rent, 
groceries, utilities, and health care. But prison destroys their earning potential.”). 
 205.  See, e.g., John Tierney, Prison and the Poverty Trap, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/science/long-prison-terms-eyed-as-contributing-to-
poverty.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/2PHM-9FF7]. Tierney writes: 
When researchers try to explain why AIDS is much more prevalent among blacks than 
whites, they point to the consequences of incarceration, which disrupts steady 
relationships and can lead to high-risk sexual behavior. When sociologists look for 
causes of child poverty and juvenile delinquency, they link these problems to the 
incarceration of parents and the resulting economic and emotional strains on families. 
Id. 
 206.  See Bibas, supra note 204 (“[P]risons are breeding grounds for crime. Instead of 
working, . . . most prisoners are forced to remain idle . . . . [P]rison clusters together neophytes 
and experienced recidivists, breeding gangs, criminal networks, and more crime.”).  
 207.  See Henderson, supra note 58, at 106 (“People of color and the poor are overrepresented 
among [prison] population[s], leading to the implication that minority-group and class bias infects 
the criminal justice system . . . . America’s carceral crisis is widely considered the most critical civil 
rights and civil liberties issue of the present . . . .” (citations omitted)).  
 208.  Bibas, supra note 204 (discussing a study by Michigan economics professor Michael 
Mueller-Smith).  
 209.  See id. (discussing a study by Mueller-Smith which found that “long sentences on 
average breed much more crime after release than they prevent during the sentence”). 
 210.  See Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration & Social Inequality, DÆDALUS: 
Summer 2010, at 8, https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=808 
[https://perma.cc/M2RR-VL6Q] (“America’s prisons and jails have produced a new social group, 
a group of social outcasts who are joined by the shared experience of incarceration, crime, 
poverty, racial minority, and low education.”). 
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minorities and low-income populations, constituting a major area of 
modern civil rights concerns.211 These concerns extend to the next 
generation as well—studies show that children with an incarcerated 
parent are more likely to suffer academically, mentally, socially, and 
physically than their peers.212 
In short, the cumulative effects of prosecuting individuals are 
significant. Yet, U.S. Attorneys consider such effects in the context of 
charging corporations with crimes, but not when deciding when and 
how to charge individuals with crimes. Given the overfederalized state 
of the U.S. criminal regime and the too many Americans in prison,213 it 
might be time to level the playing field, and expand the consideration 
of collateral consequences to individual defendants. As the revered 
Judge Learned Hand once commanded: “Thou shalt not ration 
Justice.”214 
B. Practical Implications: Arguments for and Against the 
Consideration of Collateral Consequences 
Opponents may argue that the collateral consequences of 
prosecution should be considered for corporations, and not for 
individuals, because of the different natures of corporations and 
individuals.215 Primarily, a corporation is not a natural person. 
Therefore, in addition to potentially encompassing many individuals, a 
corporation itself cannot actually commit a crime.216 
 
 211.  See supra note 207 and accompanying text.  
 212.  See Paola Scommegna, Parents’ Imprisonment Linked to Children’s Health, Behavioral 
Problems, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (Dec. 2014), http://www.prb.org/Publications/ 
Articles/2014/incarcerated-parents-and-childrens-health.aspx [https://perma.cc/EXS8-YHU3] 
(discussing how “U.S. children of incarcerated parents are an extremely vulnerable group, and 
much more likely to have behavioral problems and physical and mental health conditions than 
their peers”); Tierney, supra note 205 (discussing a study by Yale sociologist Christopher 
Wildeman which found that “children are generally more likely to suffer academically and socially 
after the incarceration of a parent”).  
 213.  See supra Part I.  
 214.  IRVING DILLIARD, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED 
HAND, at xix (1952) (describing a quote from a speech for the Legal Aid Society of New York on 
February 16, 1951, in reference to ensuring that defendants have the counsel needed to ascertain 
fair trials). 
 215.  See, e.g., Benjamin M. Greenblum, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial 
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1880–81 
(2005) (“Yet corporations are by nature a vastly different type of criminal than a drug addict or 
juvenile offender.”). 
 216.  See generally Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate 
Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 411–15 (2007) (discussing how corporations can “act” only through the 
actions of the individuals working within them).  
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However, the argument that the distinguishable nature of 
corporations supports a different set of prosecutorial considerations is 
greatly reduced by the fact that the American criminal system 
personifies corporations for purposes of criminal treatment. Most 
countries do not hold corporations responsible for crimes committed 
within the corporate domain,217 but the United States has chosen a 
different system.218 Both Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court have 
decided that corporations can, and will, be held responsible for crimes 
like individuals.219 As long as the law treats corporations and 
individuals similarly for purposes of crime, the argument that their 
dissimilar natures support different prosecutorial treatment carries less 
force.220  
This premise similarly addresses another possible argument that 
corporations and individuals should be treated differently: some may 
argue that, because corporate employees may be prosecuted criminally 
even when the corporation itself is not,221 the prosecution of corporate 
entities should not be compared to the prosecution of individuals. 
Instead, one might argue, individual prosecutions should be compared 
to the prosecution of individual corporate employees. However, as 
stated above, federal criminal law purports to see no difference 
between corporations and individuals—they are all “persons.”222 It 
 
 217.  See Edward B. Diskant, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the 
Uniquely American Doctrine Through Comparative Criminal Procedure, 118 YALE L.J. 126, 129 
(2008) (“Few other Western countries impose entity liability, and those that do impose it 
comparatively infrequently and under the threat of far less serious punitive consequences.”).  
 218.  Id.  
 219.  The U.S. Supreme Court held that corporations can be held liable for any crime under 
the doctrine of respondeat superior in 1909. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United 
States, 212 U.S. 481, 494–96 (1909). Congressional legislation also indicates that corporations are 
liable for all legal violations, just like individuals. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (stating that the 
definition of “person” throughout the United States Code includes corporate entities).  
 220.  Cf. Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of 
Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 908–31 (2011) (discussing generally the 
abrogation of many corporate constitutional rights under the law). Furthermore, although 
absolute corporate criminal responsibility through respondeat superior is currently the de juris 
rule in the United States, some scholars have argued that it should be eliminated or modified. See, 
e.g., Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 526–33 
(2006).  
 221.  See supra note 155 and accompanying text; see also Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, 
What Developments in Western Europe Tell Us About American Critiques of Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 97–104 (2004) (discussing the critiques of corporate criminal 
liability generally and reasons why liability might be better imposed solely on individual corporate 
actors).  
 222.  See supra note 219 and accompanying text. Furthermore, it is often difficult to simply 
substitute a comparison of prosecuted corporate employees for the prosecution of corporations 
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therefore makes no difference whether corporate employees are 
charged if the corporation has not also been charged because a 
“person” who has committed a crime has still gone (deliberately) 
unpunished. Under the law at least, individuals and corporations are 
on the same playing field. It is under prosecutorial charging guidance 
that they are treated differently. 
Regarding the consideration of collateral consequences in 
particular, when former Attorney General Eric Holder discussed the 
consideration of economic effects as a potential reason not to prosecute 
corporations in 2013,223 public backlash followed.224 “Too big to fail” or 
“too big to jail” became the mantra of those who disagreed with the 
DOJ’s policy of considering the collateral effects of criminally charging 
corporations.225 Consideration of collateral consequences in this 
manner, denouncers correctly asserted, “create[s] a public perception 
that the legal system is unfair.”226 Deciding whether or not to prosecute 
criminal acts on the basis of a corporation’s wealth is akin to a system 
in which “the economically weak get prosecuted, [and] the 
 
themselves because of the typical “collective” nature of corporate crimes. For further discussion 
on this point, see generally Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. 
REV. 1789 (2015).  
 223.  Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Remarks before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary Hearing 
on Oversight of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 113th Cong. (Mar. 26, 2013), (unpublished hearing 
transcript), http://congressional.proquest.com:80/congressional/docview/t65.d40.03060003.t03? 
[https://perma.cc/2USG-Y9NT] (responding to questions of Senator Grassley). 
 224.  See, e.g., Danielle Douglas, Holder Concerned Megabanks Too Big to Jail, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 6, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/holder-concerned-
megabanks-too-big-to-jail/2013/03/06/6fa2b07a-869e-11e2-999e-5f8e0410cb9d_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/3ZCB-RZS2] (discussing Holder’s remarks and the “too big to fail” 
implications); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Realities Behind Prosecuting Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Mar. 11, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/big-banks-go-wrong-but-
pay-a-little-price/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5JVF-6RZ9] (discussing same).  
 225.  See, e.g., William D. Cohan, Justice Dept. Shift on White-Collar Crime Is Long Overdue, 
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/12/business/ 
dealbook/justice-dept-shift-on-white-collar-crime-is-long-overdue.html [https://perma.cc/6CC8-
NQ6Z] (describing “too big to jail” and the “Holder Doctrine” as “horribly misguided”).  
 226.  Foster, supra note 196, at 658. Another argument against “too big to jail” revolves 
around a belief that this idea led to the “failure to prosecute any [major] institution or person for 
the events that led to the financial crisis and all the ensuing social devastation.” Roger Parloff, 
Eric Holder’s Business Legacy: ‘Too Big to Jail’?, FORTUNE (Sept. 26, 2014), http://fortune.com/ 
2014/09/26/eric-holders-business-legacy-too-big-to-jail [https://perma.cc/87JS-CTQT]. However, 
the legal and factual situation surrounding this claim is far more complicated than the argument 
facially implies. Much of the questionable activity leading to the 2008 financial crisis was just 
that—questionable. Whether any of the subsequently contemplated prosecutions could have 
succeeded if they had been pursued is far from settled. Thus, placing the blame for the lack of 
prosecutions here on “too big to jail” is an oversimplification.  
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economically powerful do not.”227 A general argument against the 
consideration of collateral consequences, in any context, may therefore 
be that such considerations are inequitable. 
However, this argument is premised upon the assumption that 
collateral consequences are considered for one group (wealthy 
corporations) and not for another (individuals). Applied in this 
manner, the consideration of collateral consequences undoubtedly 
raises concerns. But this is not the only way in which the federal system 
could apply considerations of collateral consequences. If federal 
prosecutors were guided to consider the collateral effects of charging 
individuals with crimes, in addition to considering the same for 
corporations, some of the concerns for fairness may be eliminated. 
Of course, some would argue that expanding the considerations of 
federal prosecutors in this manner would only lead to further disparate 
results. An increase in disparity usually results from any increase in the 
discretionary powers of an official.228 Here, adding a consideration for 
federal prosecutors when charging individuals would likely broaden 
discretionary power, as opposed to limiting it, because it would expand 
the issues that prosecutors could consider when making charging 
decisions. 
This Note does not address the question of whether the American 
system of broad prosecutorial discretion is inherently good or bad. But 
it is important to remember that our prosecutors have ethical duties as 
“minister[s] of justice.”229 With this duty in mind, expanding 
considerations to ensure equal application of the law is harmonious 
with the prosecutor’s role. 
Lastly, current practices and trends point toward a growing legal 
emphasis on the collateral effects of individual incarcerations. After 
decades of rulings that deemed individual collateral consequences to 
be inconsequential,230 the U.S. Supreme Court held in 2010 that lawyers 
must advise their clients when deportation is a secondary consequence 
of a guilty plea.231 This decision may indicate a shift in the Court’s view 
 
 227.  Foster, supra note 196, at 658. 
 228.  See, e.g., supra Part I.  
 229.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).  
 230.  See Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass 
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1806–16 (2012) (discussing judicial rulings which evidenced 
a lack of constitutional restraint on collateral consequences, up until the 2010 Padilla ruling). 
 231.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010).  
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of collateral consequences, which have traditionally been thought of as 
less important than the direct consequences of conviction.232 
Additionally, the connection between the consideration of 
collateral consequences and the granting of DPAs is extremely 
relevant to the topics discussed in this Note. DPAs, now primarily used 
to avoid corporate prosecutions (as in the Toyota case233), were 
originally developed as a more judicious way to prosecute juveniles.234 
The idea was to “avoid the stigma associated with formal processing 
and the resultant change in self-image, associations, and behavior 
associated with the negative societal reaction to the stigma.”235 During 
the 1960s, the use of DPAs expanded, and they became popular 
methods for prosecuting drug offenders.236 
Despite these humane origins, today federal prosecutors are six 
times more likely to offer a DPA to a corporation than to an actual 
human being.237 This is fundamentally attributable to prosecutors’ 
consideration of collateral consequences when charging corporations 
with crimes.238 The practice has garnered attention from public 
 
 232.  See Logan, supra note 185, at 1113 (“Padilla in particular might also signal a desire on 
the part of the Court to do away with the long-criticized doctrinal divide between direct and 
collateral consequences more generally, requiring courts . . . to ‘focus[] on the importance of 
particular consequences rather than their criminal or civil labels.’” (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted) (quoting Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor 
to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1147 (2011))); see also Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366 
(stating that the Court is not definitively classifying deportation as a collateral consequence here 
“because of its close connection to the criminal process”). 
 233.  See supra note 166 and accompanying text.  
 234.  Greenblum, supra note 215, at 1866.  
 235.  Id. (quoting GENNARO F. VITO & DEBORAH G. WILSON, THE AMERICAN JUVENILE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 22 (1985)).  
 236.  Id. 
 237.  This number is calculated from two figures. First, the number of pretrial diversions for 
individual defendants in 2012, which was 0.9 percent. Mark Motivans, FEDERAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, 2012—STATISTICAL TABLES, at 12 tbl.2.3 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/fjs12st.pdf [https://perma.cc/SG5D-P66X]. Second, the percentage of DPAs and 
nonprosecution agreements for corporations from 2004 to 2009, which was 5.7 percent. U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-110, DOJ HAS TAKEN STEPS TO BETTER TRACK ITS 
USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, BUT SHOULD EVALUATE 
EFFECTIVENESS 16 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/299781.pdf [https://perma.cc/9854-
ZJ5W]. See United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 42 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing the 
sources for the above numbers as a basis for comparing the number of DPAs offered to 
individuals and corporations).  
 238.  See, e.g., Greenblum, supra note 215, at 1880–83 (describing the “transplant” of DPAs 
from individuals to corporations, and how economic considerations played a factor in that 
transplant).  
AMSLER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/21/2016  3:20 PM 
2016] LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD 209 
opponents in recent years,239 and now may be a focus of judicial 
attention as well. 
In a recent opinion, Judge Emmet Sullivan, a federal district judge 
for the District of Columbia, wrote about his disappointment in the 
DOJ’s disproportionate employment of DPAs.240 Integrating collateral 
consequences, Judge Sullivan emphasized that “society is harmed at 
least as much by the devastating effect that felony convictions have on 
the lives of its citizens as it is by the effect of criminal convictions on 
corporations.”241 In the end, the recurring theme is simply this: the 
consequences of prosecuting individuals matter. 
CONCLUSION 
With the advent of collateral-consequence considerations in 
corporate criminal prosecutions, the DOJ has paved the way for 
enhanced guidance to be issued to federal prosecutors for charging 
individuals with crimes. A discussion of collateral consequences in 
individual charging guidance, already included in corporate charging 
guidance, could have important and far-reaching effects on the federal 
criminal regime. More importantly, it could remedy some of the 
unfairness presented by the current system in which federal 
prosecutors are guided to consider a superior set of factors before 
charging corporations. As Judge Sullivan noted: “[P]eople are no less 
prone to rehabilitation than corporations.”242 
It might be argued that the solution to this problem is to constrain, 
not increase, the consideration of collateral consequences. But why 
should fairness demand that everyone be worse off? In the interest of 
both “[ad]minister[ing] justice”243 and alleviating the mass-
incarceration epidemic, federal prosecutors should be expanding 
 
 239.  See, e.g., Jonathan Sack, Deferred Prosecution Agreements—The Going Gets Tougher, 
FORBES (May 28, 2015, 11:25 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2015/05/28/deferred-
prosecution-agreements-the-going-gets-tougher [https://perma.cc/PEE5-AALX]. 
 240.  See Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d at 42 (“Congress provided the deferred-
prosecution tool without limiting its use . . . . [T]he Court is disappointed that deferred-
prosecution agreements or other similar tools are not being used to provide the same opportunity 
to individual defendants to demonstrate their rehabilitation without triggering the devastating 
collateral consequences of a criminal conviction.”). 
 241.  Id. at 46.  
 242.  Id. 
 243.  See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
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equitable considerations, not eliminating them. In short, we should 
“not ration Justice.”244 
 
 244.  DILLIARD, supra note 214, at xix (emphasis added). 
